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Although senators actively participate in the confirmation debates, existing
research that examines the confirmation debates has questioned whether the Sen-
ate is capable of fulfilling its constitutional duties. Unfortunately, this research
does not fully investigate why senators participate in these important debates. To
investigate the factors that influence senatorial deliberation I build on previous
research that describes confirmation votes as opportunities for position taking and
formally models the selection stage. I argue these two strands of research provide a
framework for understanding what factors influence senatorial deliberation across
the Supreme Court appointment process. Overall, I find strong support for the hy-
pothesis that senators strategically engage Supreme Court confirmation debates.
More specifically, I find political, electoral, and institutional considerations affect
the willingness of senators to participate in these important debates.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
On 26 May 2009, President Barack Obama announced he was nominating
Judge Sonia Sotomayor to replace Justice David H. Souter on the United States
Supreme Court. Besides announcing her nomination, the President explained his
reasons for nominating Judge Sotomayor, reasons that highlighted her judicial ex-
perience and her extraordinary journey from a Bronx public housing project to
the Ivy League: “What Sonia will bring to the Court, then, is not only the knowl-
edge and experience acquired over a course of a brilliant legal career, but the
wisdom accumulated from an inspiring life’s journey.” Following the announce-
ment, the President and his administration “moved aggressively” to raise support
for her nomination by waging a public battle over her experience, and not her
ideology (Baker and Zeleny 2009; Stolberg 2009). Within days of the announce-
ment, the White House held a conference call with legal experts1 to discuss the
nomination, held a press briefing to discuss the nomination, and issued two press
1The following legal experts participated in the conference call: Professor Stephen L. Carter,
Professor of Law at Yale Law School; Paul M. Smith, Law Partner at Jenner & Block, LLP;
Professor William P. Marshall, Professor of Law at University of North Carolina School of Law;
Professor Martha L. Minow, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School; Kevin K. Russell, Law
Partner at Howe & Russell, LLP; and Dean Evan H. Caminker, Dean of the University of Michi-
gan Law School and Professor of Law (http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
advisory-conference-call-with-legal-experts-discuss-nomination-judge-sotomayor,
accessed 4 September 2013).
2releases listing individuals and organizations supporting the nomination.2 In con-
junction with the activities of his administration, President Obama personally
participated in the campaign to raise public support for Judge Sotomayor. His
first weekly radio address following the announcement as well as his television
interview with NBC Nightly News anchor Brian Williams focused on Sotomayor,
his first Supreme Court nomination. The President in both the radio address
and television interview emphasized Sotomayor’s life journey and judicial experi-
ence for why the Senate ought to confirm her nomination. These activities were
not confined to the first couple of weeks after the nomination announcement, but
continued throughout the summer.
The President however was not the only elected official to publicly discuss her
nomination. Indeed, senators on both sides of the aisle participated in the con-
firmation debates. Throughout the process Democrats echoed the President’s an-
nouncement, emphasizing Sotomayor’s extraordinary journey and previous confir-
mations. Republican senators however were less willing to praise her journey from
public housing to the Ivy League and more willing to exercise caution. Shortly
after the announcement, for example, Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell
(R-KY) issued the following statement:
Senate Republicans will treat Judge Sotomayor fairly. But we will
thoroughly examine her record to ensure she understands that the role
of a jurist in our democracy is to apply the law even-handedly, despite
their own feelings or personal or political preferences.
Our Democratic colleagues have often remarked that the Senate is
not a ‘rubber stamp.’ Accordingly, we trust they will ensure there
2Praise for Sotomayor’s Qualifications (http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
what-theyre-saying-about-judge-sotomayor, accessed 4 September 2013) and Letter
of Support to Senators from Sotomayor’s Law Clerks: (http:www.whitehouse.gov/the_
press_office/Letter-of-Support-to-Senators-from-Sotomayor-Law-Clerks/, accessed 4
September 2013)
3is adequate time to prepare for this nomination, and a full and fair
opportunity to question the nominee and debate her qualifications.3
And Senator Orrin G. Hatch (R-UT) urged combing through her record, including
“her speeches, articles, and written opinions, as well as the responses she will
provide during the coming weeks” to determine her judicial philosophy.4
Caution best describes early Republican announcements concerning Judge So-
tomayor’s nomination to the Supreme Court, but as her nomination proceeded
Republicans replaced caution with opposition. By the beginning of summer, Re-
publicans were actively campaigning against her nomination in the media, on the
Internet, and on the Senate floor.
Although senators actively participate in the confirmation debates, existing
research that examines the confirmation debates has questioned whether the Sen-
ate is capable of fulfilling its constitutional duties (Fein 1989; Carter 1995; Kagan
1995; Choi and Gulati 2004). For example, Fein (1989) writes, “The Senate, sim-
ply stated, is ill-suited intellectually, morally, and politically to pass on anything
more substantive than a nominee’s professional fitness for the office of Supreme
Court Justice” (p. 673). For the most part, critics argue senators exploit the lime-
light that accompanies the confirmation process to advance their political goals.
For example, Choi and Gulati (2004) argue that senators use Supreme Court nom-
inations to express their own political preferences, and Vaglicia (2012) argues that
senators on the Senate Judiciary Committee use confirmation hearings to commu-
nicate with their constituents during the process, thereby shifting attention from
nominees to their own political preferences. Additionally, senators are criticized
3 http://www.mcconnell.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=PressReleases&ContentRecord id=
=a4b9c8a1-6810-46b4-b27e-b252660663d3&ContentType id=c19bc7a5-2bb9-4a73-b2ab-3c1b51
91a72b&Group id=0fd6ddca-6a05-4b26-8710-a0b7b59a8f1f&MonthDisplay=5&YearDisplay=2
009, accessed 3 April 2012.
4http://www.hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/releases?ID=8270c01c-1b78-be3e-e092-014
5cec87da4, accessed 7 March 2012.
4for announcing their positions on Supreme Court nominations prior to the opening
gavel of the confirmation hearings (Davis 2005). While critics of the appointment
process have identified the evils that potentially accompany Supreme Court nomi-
nations, they do not fully investigate what factors influence senators to participate
in the confirmation debates.
To investigate the factors that influence senatorial deliberation I build on previ-
ous research that describes confirmation votes as opportunities for position taking
(Cameron, Cover and Segal 1990; Segal, Cameron and Cover 1992; Kastellec, Lax
and Phillips 2010) and formally models the selection stage (Moraski and Shipan
1999; Johnson and Roberts 2005). Position taking is consistently recognized as an
important form of legislative behavior designed to help legislators secure reelection
(Mayhew 1974) and and serves as the foundation for understanding confirmation
votes (Cameron, Cover and Segal 1990). However, there are others ways for sena-
tors to take positions throughout the confirmation process. For example, senators
can write newspaper editorials,5 post press releases on their personal websites,6
and participate in the floor debates (Vining, Steigerwalt and Trochesset 2012;
Krog and Unah 2012). Additionally, judiciary committee members can actively
participate in the hearings (Farganis and Wedeking 2014).
Supreme Court nominations provide senators ample opportunities to posi-
tion take because they are important events in American politics.7 However,
5For example, Senator John McCain (R-AZ) wrote an editorial on why he was oppos-
ing Elena Kagan’s nomination: http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/forum/
2010-07-08-column08_ST2_N.htm
6Since the nomination of John G. Roberts, senators a sizable portion of senators have posted
press releases on their personal websites.
7Senator Ted Kaufman (D-DE) described confirmation votes as the second most important
votes senators cast: “Short of voting to go to war, a Senator’s constitutional obligation to
‘advise and consent’ on Supreme Court nominees is probably his or her most important respon-
sibility” (28 June 2010). Senator Kaufman’s comment is not unique. In fact, senators regularly
say Supreme Court confirmation votes are one of the most important votes they cast because
confirmed nominees become life-time serving justices who have the opportunity to make policy
decisions that will affect millions of Americans. For instance, Justice William O. Douglas served
on the Court for more than thirty years after President Franklin D. Roosevelt died in office.
5the opportunities to position take are not constant across nominations. In fact,
previous research examining presidential participation after the announcement
(Maltese 1995b; Johnson and Roberts 2004), interest group mobilization (Mal-
tese 1995a; Cameron and Park 2011; Vining 2011), media coverage (Evans and
Pearson-Merkowitz 2012), and citizen interest (Gimpel and Wolpert 1995, 1996;
Wolpert and Gimpel 1997) suggests the attention accompanying Supreme Court
nominations fluctuates. Since the attention devoted to nominations fluctuates,
it is reasonable to expect senators to be more willing to participate in the floor
debates of nominations that generate more publicity.
Although research formally modeling the selection stage focuses on predict-
ing when confirmations will occur, it also presents a framework for understanding
when nominations are likely to attract the attention of the media, interest groups,
and American citizens. That is, this research provides a framework for under-
standing when Supreme Court nominations are likely to be engulfed in controversy,
which I argue provides supporters and opponents incentives to actively participate
throughout the confirmation process. This attention devoted to constrained nom-
inations provides senators who support or oppose nominees ample opportunities
not only to take positions and increase their visibility but also to define the debate
surrounding nominees. Supporters will use the attention devoted to these contro-
versial nominations to help nominees secure confirmation, while opponents will
use it to block nominees from securing nomination. Ultimately, both supporters
and opponents will want to participate early in the confirmation process in or-
der to define the debate surrounding Supreme Court nominations, because if they
abstain from deliberating, they risk letting their opponents define the nomination.
In addition, I examine how the characteristics of senators and nominees influ-
During his thirty-four year career on the Court, Justice Douglas participated in a number of
major cases, including Brown v. Board of Education (1954), Miranda v. Arizona (1966), Roe v.
Wade (1973), and United States v. Nixon (1974).
6ences senatorial deliberation on the floor and in the hearings. Previous research
finds the ideology and qualifications of nominees influence senatorial behavior at
the confirmation stage (Cameron, Cover and Segal 1990; Segal, Cameron and
Cover 1992; Kastellec, Lax and Phillips 2010). Taken as a whole, research on con-
firmation votes provides tremendous insight into why senators vote for (against)
nominees. However, it is not always clear how these factors will affect senatorial
deliberation, because confirmation votes differ from deliberation. Below, I discuss
when these variables are likely influence senatorial deliberation.
Outline of the Dissertation
In Chapter 2, I investigate the factors affecting senatorial deliberation by bor-
rowing from research that formally models the selection stage (see e.g., Moraski
and Shipan 1999; Johnson and Roberts 2005). Specifically, I examine how the
institutional context surrounding nominations influences senatorial deliberation
from Harold Burton (1945) to Elena Kagan (2010). This framework I argue helps
illuminate why senators participate in the confirmation debates. Additionally, I
contribute to a growing body of research that applies nomination regimes beyond
the selection stage of Supreme Court nominations (see e.g., Hitt 2013). I find
senators are more likely to participate on the floor when the preferences of the
president and Senate are on opposite sides the Supreme Court. My results also
demonstrate other factors are important for understanding who is likely to delib-
erate. That is, I find committee membership, ideology, and qualifications affect
the likelihood senators participate in the floor debates. Additionally, I find sena-
tors are more likely to participate in the floor deliberations since the nomination of
Bork. These results suggest senators are strategically participating in the Supreme
Court confirmation debates.
7In Chapter 3, I directly address whether senators announce their positions on
Supreme Court nominations prior to the opening gavel of the confirmation hear-
ings. Despite the threat pre-hearing positions pose to the role senators play in the
confirmation debates, there has been no empirical research examining whether this
is something that occurs regularly or what factors influence senatorial announce-
ments prior to the hearings. In this study, I directly investigate whether and why
senators state announce position prior to the hearings. First, I examine whether
senators publicize their positions before committee members question nominees.
Overall, I find pre-hearing announcements are rare across Supreme Court nomi-
nations from John Harlan (1955) to Elena Kagan (2010). However, when focusing
on Senate Judiciary Committee members, I find a substantial portion announce
support for (opposition to) nominees. Second, I examine the factors that influence
senatorial behavior before the hearings commence. To help understand senators
pre-hearing announcements, I build on existing research that analyzes the selection
stage with formal models (Moraski and Shipan 1999; Johnson and Roberts 2005).
By doing so, I present a framework for understanding why senators announce pre-
hearing positions. I find the institutional context surrounding nominees affects
senatorial deliberation. Specifically, I find when presidents are more constrained,
senators are more likely to declare support (opposition).
In Chapter 4, I analyze the most visible feature of the Supreme Court appoint-
ment process – the confirmation hearings. Existing research focuses on how the
changing nature of the hearings has deteriorated the quality of deliberation and
threatened the integrity of the confirmation process as a whole. However, much
of this work is based on anecdotal evidence of the most controversial nominations,
thereby leaving explanations for the individual behavior of senators underdevel-
oped. Examining confirmation hearings from Sandra Day O’Connor to Sonia
Sotomayor, I find strong support for the hypothesis that senators strategically en-
8gage nominees in discussions about Supreme Court precedents. More specifically,
I find political, electoral, and institutional considerations affect the the willingness
of senators to engage nominees in discussions about precedent before the Senate
Judiciary Committee.
9Chapter 2
Nomination Regimes and
Senatorial Participation in
Supreme Court Confirmation
Debates
Introduction
The Supreme Court confirmation debates extend beyond the hearings. In
fact, senators regularly discuss nominations on the Senate floor. Moreover, they
champion the importance of these debates. For example, on 22 October 1987,
Senator William Proxmire (D-WI) addressed the Senate to discuss the nomina-
tion of Robert Bork: “Unlike most Senators I am undecided. I will stay undecided
until the debate has resolved my doubts” (my emphasis, Cong. Rec., p. 28844).
Remarkably, his speech came the day before the Senate was scheduled to vote
on Bork’s nomination, a nomination that garnered considerable interest group
participation (Caldeira and Wright 1998; Caldeira, Hojnacki and Wright 2000),
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presidential involvement (Maltese 1995b; Johnson and Roberts 2004; Cameron and
Park 2011), and public attention (Gimpel and Wolpert 1995, 1996). Since neither
the extensive confirmation hearings nor the intensive public fight had persuaded
him to support or oppose Bork, Senator Proxmire’s speech indicated the forth-
coming debate would. Ultimately, the senator voted against Bork, but his speech
provides anecdotal evidence that confirmation debates have the power to influence
votes.
Senator Proxmire is not the only senator to discuss the importance of floor
debates. Other senators have also admitted that they reflect on, or will take into
consideration, what transpires during floor debates before deciding whether to con-
firm or reject Supreme Court nominations. For example, Senator Jennings Ran-
dolph’s (D-WV) decision to support the nomination of Clement Haynsworth Jr.
was based on “an earnest consideration of the issues brought into focus during
the hearings and further discussed in th[e] Chamber” (my emphasis, Cong. Rec.,
p. 35139). Senator Randolph’s statement reveals he considered the floor debates
even after the confirmation hearings had concluded. And more recently, Senator
Mark Begich (D-AK) released a press statement shortly after meeting with Sonia
Sotomayor, stating he intended to mull over the senatorial debates before deciding
how to vote: “I look forward to hearings in the Senate next month and our debate
on the floor before making a final decision on my vote for Judge Sotomayor” (my
emphasis, 24 June 2009).1 In a second press statement released the day the Senate
was scheduled to vote on her nomination,2 Senator Begich explained how he had
reached the decision to confirm her nomination:
I arrived at my decision carefully. I had a long meeting with Judge
1http://www.begich.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ID=21d8e164-18e9-4e00-
97b1-1d3b3c4b36e9, accessed 1 June 2014.
2Senator Begich did not participate in the Senate floor debate, but he published two press
releases on his Senate website.
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Sotomayor and I thoroughly examined her extensive record after 17
years of judicial service. I listened to the Senate debate on her nomi-
nation and I heard from hundreds of Alaskans (my emphasis, 6 August
2009).3
Viewed by itself, this press release ambiguously mentions the Senate debate, but
when viewed along with Senator Begich’s first press release, the two statements
provide evidence the senator took the floor debates into consideration before de-
ciding to confirm Sotomayor. Clearly, Senators Randolph and Begich discussed
other avenues they used to help them make their voting decision, but the broader
point still remains: confirmation debates matter because they help senators decide
whether to confirm (reject) Supreme Court nominations. While senators recognize
the importance of the floor debates, it is not completely clear why they participate.
Scholars interested in the appointment process have devoted considerable effort
to analyzing the Supreme Court confirmation debates. Although scholars devote
a great deal of attention to analyzing the confirmation hearings (Ringhand and
Collins 2011; Collins and Ringhand 2013; Farganis and Wedeking 2011, 2014),
a burgeoning body of research has begun analyzing the confirmation debates on
the Senate floor. Studying the nominations of Samuel Alito, Sonia Sotomayor,
and Elena Kagan, Vining, Steigerwalt and Trochesset (2012) find the characteris-
tics of nominees and senators influence senatorial deliberation. Specifically, they
find party leaders announce their positions early during the appointment process,
but Senate Judiciary Committee members and ideologically distant senators de-
lay announcing their positions. In contrast, Krog and Unah (2012), who study
nominations from Sandra Day O’Connor (1981) to John G. Roberts (2005), find
committee members and ideologically distant senators announce their positions
3http://www.begich.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ID=
38185c69-0f95-4995-adcc-0d5a6792af29, accessed 1 June 2014.
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early and often. Although the conclusions of Vining, Steigerwalt and Trochesset
(2012) differ from Krog and Unah (2012), both studies contribute by developing a
more complete description of how senators participate throughout the confirma-
tion process and suffer from a similar limitation. That is, neither study includes
nominees before O’Connor, which precludes both from analyzing how the institu-
tional context surrounding the nominations influences senatorial deliberation.
In this study, I develop a richer portrait of the factors affecting senatorial de-
liberation by borrowing from research that formally models the selection stage
(see e.g., Moraski and Shipan 1999; Johnson and Roberts 2005). Specifically, I ex-
amine how the institutional context surrounding nominations influences senatorial
deliberation from Harold Burton (1945) to Elena Kagan (2010).4 By doing so, I
develop a framework for understanding when senators are likely to participate in
the confirmation debates. Additionally, I contribute to a growing body of research
that applies nomination regimes beyond the selection stage of Supreme Court
nominations (see e.g., Hitt 2013). I find senators are more likely to participate on
the floor when the preferences of the president and Senate are on opposite sides
the Supreme Court. My results also demonstrate other factors are important for
understanding who is likely to deliberate. That is, I find committee membership,
ideology, and qualifications affect the likelihood senators participate in the floor
debates. Additionally, I find senators are more likely to participate in the floor
deliberations since the nomination of Bork. These results suggest senators are
strategically participating in the Supreme Court confirmation debates.
4I exclude nominations before Burton because prior to his nomination estimates for the
ideological preferences for all justices remaining on the Court do not exist, which makes it hard
to estimate the median of the Court.
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Senatorial Deliberation during Supreme Court
Nominations
Nominations Regimes
Floor speeches help senators define Supreme Court nominations and increase
their visibility among colleagues and constituents (Mayhew 1974; Rocca 2007;
Pearson and Dancey 2010). For example, shortly after President Reagan an-
nounced he was nominating Robert Bork to replace Justice Lewis Powell Jr.,
Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA) described Bork’s America on the Senate floor as
follows:
Robert Bork’s America is a land in which women would be forced
into back-alley abortions, blacks would sit at segregated lunch coun-
ters, rogue police could break down citizens’ doors in midnight raids,
schoolchildren could not be taught about evolution, writers and artists
would be censored at the whim of government, and the doors of the
Federal courts would be shut on the fingers of millions of citizens for
whom the judiciary is often the only protector of the individual rights
that are the heart of our democracy (Congressional Record, vol 133, p.
18519).
Senator Kennedy’s speech countered President Reagan’s narrative that Judge Bork
is “well prepared, evenhanded, and openminded”5 by painting the judge as a
radical conservative out of touch with and dangerous to the values Americans
treasure. Ultimately, his speech garnered extensive attention from his colleagues,
the media, and became the battle cry for interest groups opposing Bork (Watson
5“Remarks Announcing the Nomination of Robert H. Bork To Be an Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States,” http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?
pid=34503, accessed 14 June 2014.
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and Stookey 1995; Bell 2002).
The attention devoted to Bork’s nomination from interest groups (Maltese
1995a; Caldeira and Wright 1998), the media (Evans and Pearson-Merkowitz
2012), and the American public (Gimpel and Wolpert 1995, 1996; Wolpert and
Gimpel 1997) helped Senator Kennedy increase his visibility among colleagues
and constituents. However, Bork’s nomination is unique6 and suggests senators
strategically participate in the floor debates. The Senate rejected Robert Bork,
but Supreme Court nominations are normally confirmed. In fact, since 1900,
presidents have made sixty-eight Supreme Court nominations,7 and of these nom-
inations, the Senate confirmed fifty-nine (87%). Nominations to the Court are
normally confirmed because presidents “pick nominees with an eye toward the
entire process, including their chance of confirmation and impact on the court”
(Segal, Cameron and Cover 1992, p. 114). Before a president selects a nominee,
presidents regularly solicit recommendations from senators and interest groups
and subject potential nominees to background checks in order to reduce the un-
certainty of confirmation (Maltese 1995a; Yalof 1999; Nemacheck 2007).
While most nominees are confirmed, this is no indication they sail smoothly
through the Senate. As Shipan and Shannon point out, “behind this usual outcome
lies a great deal of variance in the amount of time it takes for the Senate to confirm
a nominee” (2003, 654). There is also a great deal of variance in the percentage of
senators who vote in favor of confirmation (Basinger and Mak 2012), presidential
participation after the announcement (Maltese 1995b; Johnson and Roberts 2004),
6Scholars interested in Supreme Court nominations regularly describe Bork’s nomination as a
watershed appointment (see e.g., Maltese 1995a; Caldeira and Wright 1998; Epstein, Lindsta¨dt,
Segal and Westerland 2006; Shipan 2008).
7Technically, presidents have made seventy Supreme Court nominations, but the nomination
of Douglas Ginsburg and John G. Roberts Jr. are not counted. Douglas Ginsburg’s nomination
was never officially sent in writing by President Ronald Reagan to the Senate for confirma-
tion, and Roberts’s associate justice nomination was withdrawn by President George W. Bush.
President Bush withdrew the nomination after Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist’s death and
renominated Roberts to replace the Chief Justice.
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interest group mobilization (Maltese 1995a; Cameron and Park 2011; Vining 2011),
media coverage (Evans and Pearson-Merkowitz 2012), and nomination regimes
(Moraski and Shipan 1999; Johnson and Roberts 2005). Taken as a whole, these
studies reveal the attention accompanying Supreme Court nominations fluctuates.
Since the attention devoted to nominations fluctuates, it is reasonable to expect
senators to be more willing to participate in the floor debates of nominations that
generate more publicity.
To develop a framework for understanding why senators deliver floor speeches
about Supreme Court nominations I borrow from the insights of research that for-
mally models the selection stage (Moraski and Shipan 1999; Johnson and Roberts
2005). The prominent factor in this literature is the institutional configuration
of the president, Senate, and Supreme Court. More specifically, how the prefer-
ences of these political actors are configured determines whether nominations may
occur.
Both Moraski and Shipan (1999) and Johnson and Roberts (2005) present
formal models for understanding when Supreme Court nominations are likely to
occur. However, they emphasize different aspects of the Senate in their models.8
The models describe nominations by their institutional configurations. In the
unconstrained regime the president’s ideological preference is located between the
preferences of the Senate and Court. Given this configuration, presidents can
expect that if they nominate individuals who share their preferences, then their
nominees will be confirmed. Unconstrained presidents can expect their nominees
to be confirmed because they know the Senate prefers to shift the ideological
balance of the Court in the same direction. While both agree the ideological
direction of the Court needs to be shifted, the president prefers a more moderate
8Moraski and Shipan (1999) use the Senate median to represent the Senate and Johnson and
Roberts (2005) use the filibuster pivot.
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nominee than the Senate.
In the semi-constrained regime the Senate’s ideological preference is located
between the preferences of the president and Court. While the president and
Senate agree on the direction to move the Court, the Senate prefers a nominee
that is more moderate than the president prefers. Although semi-constrained
presidents prefer to move the Court farther than the Senate prefers, they know
the Senate will reject ideologically extreme nominees. Hence, these presidents will
compromise and appoint moderate nominees because they do not want to suffer
the humiliation that accompanies unsuccessful nominations.
Finally, in the fully constrained regime the preferences of the president and
Senate are on opposite sides of the Court. That is, the Court’s preferences are
located between the two. Because the president and Senate cannot agree on
which direction to move the Court, the president is constrained. By attempting
to shift the Court towards their own preferences and away from the Senate, fully
constrained presidents can expect their nominations will be rejected. Hence, fully
constrained presidents should be expected to appoint nominees who will not shift
the balance of the Court.
Although the regime literature focuses primarily on who is likely to be selected
and provides predictions for when confirmations will occur, it also presents a frame-
work for thinking about senatorial participation. Within each regime senators
know the ideological preferences they can expect from Supreme Court nominees.
Additionally, they have a rough sense of the confirmation prospects for nominees
of unconstrained, semi-constrained, and fully constrained presidents. For example,
when presidents are unconstrained, senators can reasonably expect the preferences
of nominees to reflect the preferences of appointing presidents and expect these
nominees to easily secure confirmation. Similarly, when semi-constrained presi-
dents strategically compromise by submitting nominees that reflect the Senate’s
17
preference, senators know these nominees will be confirmed. In these nomination
regimes, senators expect little controversy to arise. In contrast, when presidents
are fully constrained, senators know nominees can alter the ideological balance
of the Court and must overcome larger confirmation obstacles. Moreover, sena-
tors expect these nominations to receive extensive attention from the media and
interest groups. Indeed, research on Supreme Court nominations and media cov-
erage suggests the institutional configuration of the president, Senate, and Court
may influence the amount of coverage nominations receive (Evans and Pearson-
Merkowitz 2012). Although Evans and Pearson-Merkowitz do not specifically
address whether nomination regimes influence coverage, the patterns of media
coverage for nominations since Sandra Day O’Connor suggest the nominations of
fully constrained presidents receive more coverage than the nominations of semi-
constrained presidents.9 Furthermore, anecdotal accounts suggest the nominees of
constrained presidents receive more attention (see e.g., Carter 1995; Davis 2005).
Given that constrained presidents can shift the balance of the Court away from
the Senate, I expect these nominations to garner more attention, and I expect
senators to be more likely to actively participate in these confirmation debates.
Constrained Regime Hypothesis. Senators will be more likely to partic-
ipate in the confirmation debates when appointing presidents are fully
constrained.
Member Characteristics
In addition, a senator’s decision to participate in the Senate floor debates may
well be strategic because costs accompany deliberation. Deliberating on the Senate
floor is not a costless activity, and senators have to expend valuable resources to
9See Evans and Pearson-Merkowitz (2012) Appendix A, p. 1053.
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learn about and participate in the floor debates about Supreme Court nominees.
For example, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) discussed the personal sacrifice that
was required of him to become thoroughly informed about the policy preferences
of Robert Bork:
I asked my staff, “Would you please bring me the materials that Judge
Bork has written so I can read them?” The 3,000 or so pages that they
presented to me changed my recess plans quite a bit. I have already
called my wife and said: take that shelf full of books in our farmhouse
in Vermont – you know that history of World War I that I keep saying
that I am going to read – and clear them out because we have got
something that takes up a lot more room and something I am going
to have to read.... Because what I read there will determine to a great
deal how I am going to vote on this nomination (Congessional Record
vol 133, p. 22830, 6 August 1987).
While the cost of becoming informed about Bork came at the expense of plea-
sure reading for Senator Leahy, the broader point still remains: Time devoted to
learning about nominees is time diverted from other activities, such as legislating,
campaigning, or fundraising. Hence, it is reasonable to expect senators better
positioned to handle the costs of becoming familiar with Supreme Court nominees
will be more likely to discuss nominations in the floor debates.
As previously mentioned, participation in the confirmation debates is not a
costless activity. As the passage from Senator Leahy indicates, time devoted to
deliberation, to the collection and consumption of information on Supreme Court
nominees, is time diverted from other activities.10 However, the costs accompa-
10These costs are similar to the information and traction costs discussed by (Hall 1996): “...
transaction costs refers to the time and effort required for the enterprise to acquire, assimilate,
and apply issue specific policy information... transaction costs, in turn, include the time and
effort required to communicate with other actors...” (p. 87).
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nying participation are not constant across senators. Some senators, especially
committee members, are better positioned to defray the costs of deliberation.
Committee members are thought to possess more knowledge and expertise about
the issue areas within the jurisdiction of their committee. This also holds for the
Senate Judiciary Committee.
Previous research demonstrates the institutional structure of the legislating
process provides committees opportunities to specialize in policy or issue areas
(Krehbiel 1991). One reason committee members are thought to have opportuni-
ties to specialize is because of interest groups. Interest groups have been found to
lobby the committee members on the committee of jurisdiction Hall and Grofman
(1990); Hall and Deardorff (2006). By being involved with these groups more
often, committee members have occasions to procure information from a diverse
set of interests, which helps minimize the uncertainty accompanying potential leg-
islation. Similarly, this also holds for Supreme Court nominations. Like other
committees in the legislative process, the Senate Judiciary Committee, during the
confirmation process, is frequently in contact with interest groups. Indeed, the
analysis of Caldeira and Wright (1998) clearly shows that interest groups are more
likely to lobby committee members. Judiciary committee members also have the
opportunity to question interest groups during the confirmation hearings. Besides
having access to more information, judiciary members may feel they have a duty
to participate in the debates. After all, non-members commonly express the view
that they will follow the activities of the judiciary committee, its hearings and
recommendations, because they want to hear what it has to say about Supreme
Court nominees. However, the hearings and committee votes are not the only way
for members to communicate with non-members. Another way for members to
discuss nominations is on the Senate floor. Hence, I expect the following:
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Senate Judiciary Committee Hypothesis. Senators who are members
of the Senate Judiciary Committee will be more likely to participate
in debates on the Senate floor.
Nominee Characteristics
Existing literature on the confirmation stage for Supreme Court nominations
serves as the foundation for understanding senatorial behavior throughout the
process. This literature finds that ideology and qualifications are prominent in-
fluences on confirmation votes (Cameron, Cover and Segal 1990). Indeed, the
impact of these variables is consistently found to affect confirmation votes, even
after controlling for a host of factors including a senator’s home state demograph-
ics (Overby, Henschen, Walsh and Strauss 1992), public opinion (Kastellec, Lax
and Phillips 2010), and partisan polarization (Shipan 2008; Basinger and Mak
2012).
Senators vote against ideologically distant nominees because they would be-
come worse off if the nominees become justices. Because senators care about policy
and justices make policies based on their own ideological preferences (Segal and
Spaeth 1993, 2002; Epstein and Knight 1998), senators consider the preferences
of nominees when casting confirmation votes. For example, Senator Chuck Grass-
ley (R-IA) explained why he opposed Sonia’s Sotomayor’s nomination stating, “I
cannot support her nomination because I’m not persuaded that she has the right
judicial philosophy for the Supreme Court” (Congressional Record vol. 155, p.
S8922, 6 August 2009). That is, Senator Grassley’s opposition to Sotomayor’s
Supreme Court nomination was based on philosophical (viz., ideological) consid-
erations. In terms of confirmation votes, it is reasonable to expect senators will
be more likely to confirm nominees with similar ideological preferences. Although
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this situation does not completely describe senatorial deliberation, it presents
a way for understanding why senators deliberate. Clearly, ideologically distant
senators who oppose Supreme Court nominations have incentives to address their
colleagues. They do it to define nominations and mobilize opposition. In contrast,
those senators who are ideologically distant but are supportive of the nominees
may be more likely to discuss the nomination in order to explain why they have
chosen to vote to confirm or raise support for nominees. Ideological distant sen-
ators who are uncertain about the policy consequences accompanying nominees
may become involved to express their uncertainty or discuss the issue areas they
are intend to consider when deciding how to cast their confirmation votes. All of
these possibilities suggests the following:
Ideological Distance Hypothesis. Senators will be more likely to partic-
ipate in the confirmation debates for ideologically distant nominees.
As for qualifications, previous research clearly indicates senators are more likely
to vote for highly qualified and less likely for poorly qualified nominees (Cameron,
Cover and Segal 1990; Epstein et al. 2006). In terms of senatorial deliberation,
I expect senators to be more likely to debate the nomination of poorly qualified
nominees. They will be more likely for two reasons: First, they will be uncer-
tain whether the nominees meet the minimum standards necessary for becoming
justices and will seek to find out whether nominees possess the qualifications. Sec-
ond, they will participate on the Senate floor to try and defeat poorly qualified
nominees. Either way, I expect the following:
Qualifications Hypothesis. Senators will be more likely to participate
in the confirmation debates when presidents nominate poorly qualified
nominees.
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Data and Methods
To evaluate the influence of political and institutional factors on confirmation
debates, I analyze senators’ speeches on Supreme Court nominations from Harold
Burton (1945) to Elena Kagan (2010).11 The data set consists of all speeches on
each of the forty-three nominations. The unit of analysis is the individual senator,
and there is an entry for each senator in the data set for each nomination, for a
total of 3,187 observations. To identify each senatorial speech about a Supreme
Court nominee, I searched the Congressional Record for speeches on the Senate
floor from the day a nomination was submitted to the Senate to the day the
Senate confirmed (rejected) a nominee. For the purposes of this paper, a speech
indicates whether senators participated in the confirmation debates. Although
some senators delivered more than one speech about a nominee, I am primarily
interested in analyzing whether senators participated in the floor debates. In total,
1,026 senators participated across thirty-four Supreme Court nominations.
Figure 2.1 displays the percentage of senators who delivered floor speeches on
Supreme Court nominations from Harold Burton (1945) to Elena Kagan (2010).
The vertical axis is the percentage of senators who participated in these debates,
the horizontal axis displays the nominations chronologically,12 and the dashed
gray line demarcates the fifty percent threshold. The figure clearly shows that the
percentage of senators discussing nominations on the Senate floor has increased.
There are more senators participating in Kagan’s confirmation debates than in
Burton’s.
11I begin with Justice Burton because ideological estimates exist for all justices on the Court
at the time of his nomination. Prior to Burton’s nomination Cover Segal scores (Segal and
Cover 1989) do not exist for all justices leaving the Court. This makes it difficult to estimate
the Court’s median.
12The nominations of Homer Thornberry, Douglas Ginsburg, and Harriet Miers have been
excluded. In addition, Douglas Ginsburg’s nomination has been excluded. Although President
Ronald Reagan announced he was nominating Ginsburg to replace Justice Lewis F. Powell, the
President never officially nominated him to replace the retiring justice.
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Figure 2.1: Percentage of Senators who Discuss Supreme Court Nominations in
Senate Floor Speeches, 1945-2010. The graph displays the percentage of senators
who made a speech on the Senate floor all but two Supreme Court nominations.
The grey-dashed line marks the fifty percent line. The nominations of Homer
Thornberry, Douglas Ginsburg, and Harriet Miers have not been included.
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Figure 2.1 also shows sharp increases in the percentage of senators delivering
floor speeches. The first increase accompanied Thurgood Marshall’s nomination.
The percentage of senators debating Marshall more than doubled those debating
previous nominees. Indeed, prior to Marshall, Figure 2.1 shows the percentage of
senators participating in deliberations never exceeded twenty percent. Moreover,
in five of the previous nominations the percentage of senators speaking on the
floor is below ten percent. 13
Less than a year after Marshall’s confirmation, the percentage of senators par-
ticipating in Abe Fortas’s confirmation debates exceeds fifty percent, and two of
the next three nominations received more deliberation than Fortas. Focusing on
nominations from Fortas (Chief Justice nomination) to Antonin Scalia, Figure 2.1
shows the nominations of Justice John Paul Stevens and Antonin Scalia received
little discussion from senators, and with good reason. President Gerald Ford nom-
inated Stevens approximately a year after pardoning Richard Nixon and less than
a year before the 1976 presidential election. Needless to say, President Ford was
looking to avoid a confirmation fight and looking for a nominee that would quickly
win confirmation. As for Scalia, his nomination was continent on the promotion of
Justice William H. Rehnquist to replace Chief Justice Warren Burger. Ultimately,
senators, especially Democrats, focused on Rehnquist.14 Overall, there are more
senators discussing nominations from Fortas to Scalia than were prior to Marshall.
The third increase in the percentage of senators discussing nominees occurs
with Robert Bork. This indicates conventional wisdom about Bork being a water-
shed appointment is partly correct. Indeed, more than eighty percent of senators
participated in the Bork confirmation debates. Since Bork, more than half of
the Senate discussed six of the nine nominations. The three nominations that
13The nominees include Harold Burton, Fred Vinson, William Brennan, Charles Whittaker,
and Byron White.
14For discussion of both nominations see Abraham (2008) and Watson and Stookey (1995).
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did not exceed fifty percent include Anthony Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
and Stephen Breyer. Kennedy was nominated because Bork’s nomination failed.
Bader Ginsburg and Breyer were President Bill Clinton’s nominees, and the Pres-
ident worked hard behind the scenes to secure confirmation for Bader Ginsburg
and Breyer (Johnson and Roberts 2004). Since John G. Robert’s nomination, the
percentage of senators exceeds fifty percent. In fact, the percentage of senators de-
bating the nominations of Roberts, Alito, and Sotomayor exceeds eighty percent.
Elena Kagan’s nomination also draws a good deal of discussion from senators.
Overall, Figure 2.1 shows the nomination environment started changing during
the 1960s but then accelerated after Robert Bork’s nomination (see e.g., Epstein
et al. 2006).
Independent Variables
To investigate the factors that influence senators to participate in the con-
firmation debates, I build on research that formally models models the selection
stage and research that models confirmation votes as a function of the ideological
distance between a senator and a nominee, a nominee’s qualifications, presiden-
tial strength, and partisanship (see e.g., Cameron, Cover and Segal 1990; Segal,
Cameron and Cover 1992; Epstein et al. 2006).
Regimes. To investigate the relationship between institutional context and
senatorial deliberation I use Judicial Common Space scores (Epstein, Martin, Segal
and Westerland 2007) to represent the preferences of the Senate, president, and
Supreme Court. The Senate’s ideal point is the median member. The Supreme
Court’s ideology is defined as the median of the Court after a vacancy occurs.
Although other measures have been used to construct the nomination regimes, I
use Judicial Common Space scores because it was designed to place the preferences
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of all three into a single dimension policy space.
Additionally it is worth discussing why I use the median instead of the fili-
buster pivot to demarcate the Senate. I use the Senate median for two reasons.
First, I use the median because it is commonly used to represent the Senate in
research analyzing the selection stage (see e.g., Hammond and Hill 1993; Moraski
and Shipan 1999; Nokken and Sala 2000; Shipan and Shannon 2003; Krehbiel
2007; Hitt 2013). Second, it is not exactly clear why the filibuster pivot should be
preferred when examining Supreme Court nominations. Although Johnson and
Roberts (2005) note the nomination of Justice Abe Fortas to replace Chief Jus-
tice Earl Warren was filibustered and ultimately defeated, it is unclear whether
ideology was the primary reason Fortas was defeated. During the confirmation
debates, on the floor and in the hearings, senators were concerned about Fortas’s
objectivity as a justice. More specifically, senators were concerned about his re-
lationship as a consultant to President Johnson and his speaking engagements at
American University, for which he was paid an annual stipend of $20,000 from the
family foundation of Louis E. Wolfson, who was serving time in prison for fraud-
ulent financial dealings (Abraham 2008). In addition, when President Johnson
announced the nomination, he was a lame duck president – a president in the final
year of his term. Moreover, when President Johnson nominated Fortas in 1968,
the President had already announced he would not seek reelection in the fall. For
these reasons, I used the Senate median instead of the filibuster pivot.15
Ideological distance. To assess the effect of ideological distance on the likelihood
senators will take a position on the Senate floor, I calculate the ideological distance
between senators and nominees for every Supreme Court nomination from Harold
Burton (1945) to Elena Kagan (2010). Specifically, I calculate the ideological
distance between senators and nominees by squaring the difference between their
15Using the filibuster pivot does not change the substantive findings presented below.
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Judicial Common Space scores.16 These scores, originally created by Epstein et al.
(2006), place presidents, senators, and justices in a unidimensional policy space.
That is, Epstein et al. use a bridging technique to create comparable estimates
for the preferences of all three that are based on Common Space scores (Poole and
Rosenthal 1997) and Segal Cover scores (Segal and Cover 1989). Higher values
indicate greater ideological distance between senators and nominees.
Judicial Common Space scores are not the only estimates that place presidents,
senators, and nominees in a unidimensional policy space. However, I use them for
two reasons. First, the Judicial Common Space is commonly used in research not
examining the Supreme Court appointment process (see e.g., Clark 2009; Boyd,
Epstein and Martin 2010; Segal, Westerland and Lindquist 2011). Second, the
Judicial Common Space provides estimates for all nominees under investigation.
This is not the case for other estimates commonly used by scholars. For example,
Bailey (2007) develops estimates for the ideological preferences of political actors
based on their votes and publicly expressed positions. Because these estimates are
based on the votes and positions of sitting presidents, senators, and justices, Bai-
ley’s (2007) estimates do not provide estimates for Supreme Court nominees who
were not confirmed. This means there is no estimate for Robert Bork, whose nom-
ination is considered to be a watershed moment in American politics (Martinek,
Kemper and Van Winkle 2002; Epstein et al. 2006).
Lacks Qualifications. To assess whether nominees lack the qualifications neces-
sary to serve as Supreme Court justices, I use Segal Cover scores (Segal and Cover
1989). Segal and Cover estimate the qualifications of nominees by content analyz-
ing newspaper editorials. The editorials came from a set of ideologically balanced
newspapers,17 and were written after the nomination was announced but before
16Data for this variable as well as other variables normally included to model confirmation
votes come from http://epstein.usc.edu/research/Bork.html.
17Originally, (Segal and Cover 1989) content analyzed newspaper editorials in the New York
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the Senate voted to confirm (reject) the nomination. This variable ranges from 0
(most qualified) to 1 (least qualified).
Committee Member. Coded 1 if senators are members of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, 0 otherwise.
In addition to these variables, I control for several other factors that are con-
sistently included in examinations of the Supreme Court confirmation process.
Bork. Coded 1 if the nomination is the nomination of Bork or after, 0 otherwise.
Same Party. Coded 1 if senators and presidents are members of the same
party, 0 otherwise.
Strong President. Coded 1 if the president is strong, 0 otherwise. A strong
president is a president who is not in his fourth year of office and his party controls
the Senate.
Reelection. To capture the proximity of reelection a dichotomous variable is
included, coded 1 if a senator is up for reelection in the upcoming election, 0
otherwise.
Years in Office. The number of years served by senators is simply the difference
between the year a nomination occurred and the first year a senator assumed office.
Analysis
Before turning to the full regression results, I examine the basic relationship
between nomination regimes and senatorial participation in the confirmation de-
bates. Table 2.1 displays this relationship. The dependent variable, senatorial
participation, consists of two values: senators did participate or did not partici-
pate in the floor debates. The independent variable, nomination regimes, consists
Times, Washington Post, Chicago Tribune, and Los Angeles Times. Segal, Epstein, Cameron
and Spaeth (1995) increased the number of newspapers by also content analyzing the St. Louis
Post-Dispatch and The Wall Street Journal.
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of three values: the president is unconstrained, semi-constrained, or fully con-
strained. Each column of Table 2.1 contains the percentage and raw frequencies
(in parentheses) of cases falling into each category of senatorial participation. This
table shows 1,026 of 3,187 (32%) senators participated in the confirmation debates
and presents empirical support that the institutional regimes characterizing nom-
inations is driving senatorial deliberation. Additionally, it shows that 22 of 199
(11%) of senators in the unconstrained regime, 439 of 1,565 (28%) of senators in
the semi-constrained regime, and 565 of 1,423 (40%) of senators in the fully con-
strained regime participated on the Senate floor. Overall, the pattern displayed
in Table 2.1 is consistent with the hypothesis that moving from unconstrained to
semi-constrained the percentage of senators participating in the debates increases.
Likewise, moving from the semi-constrained to the fully constrained regime in-
creases the percentage of senators participating by approximately 12%. Again,
this pattern of increasing participation in regimes where the appointing president
has less freedom to appoint likeminded nominees supports the contention that sen-
atorial participation is a strategic reaction to the institutional context surrounding
Supreme Court nominations.
Turning to the multivariate analysis, Table 2.2 illuminates the forces that in-
fluence senatorial participation during Supreme Court nominations from Harold
Burton (1945) to Elena Kagan (2010). The results presented in the table show the
coefficients using logistic analysis (robust standard errors in parentheses). Contin-
uous predictors have been standardized by subtracting the mean and dividing by
2 standard deviations.18 Overall, the model performs reasonably well and provides
empirical support for the notion that senatorial participation in the confirmation
debates is shaped by institutional context surrounding Supreme Court nomina-
18Continuous predictors are standardized to allow these coefficients to be comparable the
coefficients attached to the dichotomous variables (Gelman and Hill 2007)
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Nomination Regimes
Participated Unconstrained Semi-Constrained Fully Constrained Total
No 88.94% 71.95% 60.30% 67.81%
(177) (1,126) (858) (2,161)
Yes 11.06% 28.05% 39.70% 32.19%
(22) (439) (565) (1,026)
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
(199) (1,565) (1,423) (3,187)
Table 2.1: Senatorial participation in Supreme Court confirmation debates, by
Nomination Regimes from Harold Burton (1945) to Elena Kagan (2010)
(cross-tabulation).
tions.
The coefficient for Regime is significant and in the expected direction. This
result demonstrates that the institutional context surrounding nominations affects
senatorial deliberation. As presidents become more constrained, or are less free to
appoint likeminded nominees, senators are more likely to participate in confirma-
tion debates, even after controlling for other factors thought to affect senatorial
deliberation. Moreover, this evidence is consistent with previous research that
finds senators strategically participate in the confirmation hearings (Cameron,
Cover and Segal 1990) and that disagreement between the president and the Sen-
ate results in a more vociferous confirmation process (Watson and Stookey 1995;
Davis 2005; Eisgruber 2007).
Additionally, both the coefficients for ideological distance and qualifications
are positive and statistically significant. The positive coefficient for the first indi-
cates senators will be more likely to participate in the floor deliberations as the
ideological distance increases between them and nominees, when qualifications is
set to its mean value (0). As for qualifications, the positive coefficient for this vari-
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Coef.
b/se
Regime 0.483***
(0.08)
Ideological Distance 0.615***
(0.09)
Lacks Qualifications 0.559***
(0.09)
Committee Member 1.012***
(0.11)
Post Bork 2.028***
(0.10)
Same Party as President 0.398***
(0.10)
Strong President 0.009
(0.09)
Senator Faces Reelection -0.052
(0.09)
Years in Office 0.008
(0.00)
Ideology*Qualifications 0.727***
(0.15)
Constant -3.089***
(0.22)
N 3187
AIC 3263.06
Table 2.2: Predicting senatorial participation during the confirmation debates,
Harold Burton (1945) to Elena Kagan (2010). The dependent variable is whether
senators participated in the debates (1=participated, 0=otherwise). Continuous
predictors have been standardized by subtracting the mean and dividing by 2
standard deviations. AIC = Akaike Information Criterion. *p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05;
*** p < 0.01.
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able demonstrates senators are more likely to deliberate as the quality of nominees
decreases, when ideological distance is set to its mean value (0).19 To facilitate
the interpretation for the interaction of these two variables, I graph the predicted
probabilities for senatorial deliberation as a function of the ideological distance
between senators and nominees.
Figure 2.2 illustrates how the probability of participating across ideological
distance for both the semi-constrained (top panel) and fully constrained (bottom
panel) regimes. The solid black lines indicates point predictions for highly quali-
fied nominees (value set at 3rd quartile), the dashed black lines indicates poorly
qualified nominees (1st quartile). The dotted light gray lines show uncertainty
surrounding the predictions using the estimated standard errors for these coeffi-
cients (95% confidence interval). While senators in fully constrained regimes are
more likely than senators in semi-constrained regimes to participate in the floor
debates, the two panels demonstrate similar patterns: When the ideological dis-
tance increases between poorly qualified nominees and senators, the probability of
senators participating in the confirmation debates on the Senate floor increases.
However, when the ideological distance increases between highly qualified nom-
inees and senators, the probability of senators participating in the confirmation
debates decreases slightly. These results suggest ideological distance plays a role in
senatorial deliberation when nominees are poorly qualified, but is not as influential
for highly qualified nominees.
The statistical results also demonstrate that committee membership affects
senatorial deliberation. As expected, the coefficient for committee membership is
positive and significant, indicating that committee members are more likely to par-
ticipate in the confirmation debates than non-members. The odds for committee
19This variable is recorded similar to how previous research records it: higher values indicate
lower quality nominees and lower values indicate higher quality nominees.
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Figure 2.2: Predicted probabilities of senators participating in floor debates as a
function of ideological distance. The y-axis displays the probability senators
participated on the Senate floor during Supreme Court nominations, and the
x-axis displays the ideological distance between nominees and senators from low
(10th percentile) to high (90th percentile). The solid black line indicates point
predictions for highly qualified nominees (value set at 3rd quartile), the dashed
black line indicates poorly qualified nominees (1st quartile). The dotted light
gray lines show uncertainty surrounding the predictions using the estimated
standard errors for these coefficients (95%). Continuous and interval variables
have been set to their mean values, and all other dichotomous variables are set
to their modes.
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members participating in the debates are two times higher than for non-members.
Given that judiciary committee members have better information about nominees
(Caldeira and Wright 1998; Bell 2002), this result suggests that committee mem-
bers use their private information to shape the discourse surrounding Supreme
Court nominations beyond the confirmation hearings.
Many of the control variables are significant. For example, the coefficient rep-
resenting all nominations since Bork is positive and significant, which is consistent
with previous research that suggests his nomination was watershed appointment
(see e.g., Hendershot 2010). The variable for same party as the president suggests
senators who are members of the appointing president’s party are more likely to
participate in the confirmation debates. Likewise, the coefficient for strong presi-
dent is positive and significant. That is, when the appointing president is strong,
senators are more likely to participate in the debates on the Senate floor. This find-
ing potentially suggests that senators are participating to evince their support for
nominees or to discuss those issue areas and precedents they intend to base their
confirmation votes on. In addition, I control for how long senators have served
in the Senate and and whether they are running for reelection in the upcoming
general election. The first, years in office, is positive and significant, suggesting
that the longer senators have held office the more likely they are to deliberate.
However, the substantive significance of this variable is minimal, moving years in
office from its minimum (0) to its maximum (19) value increases the likelihood
senators will participate in deliberations by approximately six percent. Finally,
the results indicate the coefficient for reelection is negative but insignificant, which
indicates that senators facing reelection are no more or less likely to participate
in the floor debates than senators not running for reelection.
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Conclusion
Existing research on Supreme Court nominations has primarily focused on the
selection stage and confirmation stage, emphasizing ideology, as well as other fac-
tors, for determining whom the president nominates and why senators vote to
confirm (reject) nominees. This body of research has illuminated the confirmation
process, but for the most part, it has left senatorial deliberation beyond the confir-
mation hearings underdeveloped. Specifically, it was unclear senators participate
in the confirmation debates on the Senate floor.
The results presented above suggest the institutional context surrounding Supreme
Court nominations affects senatorial participation in these important debates. Be-
cause senators expect the nominations of constrained presidents to receive more
attention from the media and interest groups, senators are more likely to address
these nominations in Senate floor speeches. That is, by participating in the de-
bates senators recognize that these speeches may not only help them gain visibility
among their colleagues and constituents but also influence confirmation outcomes.
Beyond the influence of the nomination regimes, I find other considerations
influence senatorial participation in the confirmation debates. In particular, two
factors demonstrate sizable influence on senatorial deliberation. Senators who
serve on the Senate Judiciary Committee are more likely to participate in the
floor debates than senators who are not committee members. Substantively, this
suggests committee members are attempting to transmit their private information
to non-committee members. Additionally, sensors are more likely to participate
in the floor deliberations since the nomination of Bork. Additionally, the two fac-
tors that serve as the cornerstones for research on confirmation votes – ideology
and qualifications – influence senatorial deliberation. As expected, as the ideolog-
ical distance between senators and nominees increases the likelihood senators will
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deliver floor speeches increases as well. As for the qualifications of nominees, sen-
ators are more likely to discuss poorly qualified nominees, possibly to make sure
these nominees meet the minimum qualifications necessary for becoming Supreme
Court justices. Finally, I find electoral considerations and seniority do not influ-
ence senatorial participation. Senators who are running for reelection participate
less on the Senate floor than senators not up for reelection.
My analyses focus on how many speeches senators made on the Senate floor
during Supreme Court nominations, and does not address other aspects senato-
rial behavior during the confirmation process. However, it provides a first step
in examining the other ways senators participate throughout confirmation process
and provides a fuller picture of how senators actively engage Supreme Court nom-
inations beyond casting confirmation votes. In addition, the research above con-
tributes to the growing body of literature examining how the institutional context
surrounding Supreme Court nominations affects senatorial participation in these
important processes. While I do find support for traditional factors thought to
influence senatorial behavior, I also find that senators are strategically participat-
ing in the Supreme Court confirmation debates. While critics of the confirmation
debates may argue that by participating in the most contentious of nominations,
senators threaten the integrity of the appointment process and Senate. However,
this overlooks the fact that by deliberating senators are providing a voice to their
constituents (Hall 1996; Collins and Ringhand 2013) and potentially lends legiti-
macy to the Court and its decisions.
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Chapter 3
Pre-Hearing Position Taking
Senators regard confirmation hearings as significant features of Supreme Court
nominations because they are occasions for them to interact meaningfully with
nominees. Although senators and nominees interact beyond the hearings, both
the written questionnaires and courtesy calls lack the opportunities that accom-
pany the hearings. The written questionnaires1 not only fall outside the public
limelight but are intended to help senators “come to the hearings better prepared
to ask more difficult questions of the nominees” (Farganis and Wedeking 2014,
26). As for courtesy calls,2 these meetings occur shortly after presidents announce
nominations. For example, two days after President Barack Obama announced
he was nominating Elena Kagan to replace Justice John Paul Stevens, she visited
“Capitol Hill to meet with key senators, including Judiciary Committee chair-
man Patrick Leahy, Jeff Sessions, and Majority Leader Harry Reid” (Christensen
2010). Likewise, Judge Sonya Sotomayor “made her first visit to Capitol Hill as
1The written questionnaires require “detailed financial data, including a full listing of assets
and liabilities, a five-year income report, a list of businesses or enterprises with which the can-
didate has been connected during the past decade or has a continuing financial interest in, a list
of deferred compensation agreements and stock options the candidate has entered into, and a
list of political contributions and contributions accepted” (Slotnick 1978, p. 506).
2“Only since the 1970s has it been the norm for Supreme Court nominees to pay courtesy
calls on selected Senators, moving from office to office” (Rotunda 1995, p. 129).
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a Supreme Court nominee” a week after the President announced her nomination
(Herszenhorn and Hulse 2009). The quick turnaround between announcements
and visits leaves senators little time to prepare for these meetings. Moreover,
courtesy calls are not designed for senators to become familiar with the nominees
but for presidents to build support for their Supreme Court nominees.
Since opportunities for senators to interact meaningfully with nominees are
limited, it is no surprise that senators extol the confirmation hearings. For ex-
ample, Senator Barbara Mikulski (D-MD) described Supreme Court confirmation
hearings as follows: “The hearings are incredibly important, they provide the Sen-
ate and the American public with the opportunity to know more about where the
nominee stands on core constitutional principles” (Congressional Record vol. 151,
no. 113, p. S9908). Senator Mikulski’s statement not only indicates the hearings
help senators and citizens learn about the preferences of nominees but also implies
senators use the information produced by the hearings when deciding whether to
confirm nominees.
Senator Mikulski is not the only senator to praise the confirmation hearings.
In fact, senators regularly discuss the importance of the hearings and suggest these
proceedings help them when deciding whether to confirm (reject) Supreme Court
nominations. For example, Senator Bob Bennett (R-Utah) released the following
press statement explaining how the hearings helped him come to a decision about
Kagan’s nomination:
Bennett Statement Opposing Supreme Court Nominee Elena Kagan:
Washington D.C. – After thoroughly reviewing her testimony at the
Senate Judiciary Committee hearings this week, Senator Bob Bennett
(R-Utah) issued the following statement today announcing his intent
to vote against the nomination of Elena Kagan to serve on the United
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States Supreme Court:
“I have great respect for Senator Hatch’s judgment. I am impressed
by the thoroughness of his questioning during the hearing and have
withheld my judgment until after the hearings were over. I agree that
many of the things in Ms. Kagan’s background are troublesome and
justify a negative vote.”3
In addition to reinforcing his decision to oppose Kagan’s nomination, Senator Ben-
nett’s press release indicates the interaction between a single senator (in this case
Senator Orin Hatch) and a nominee is sufficient enough to influence confirmation
votes.
Despite the importance senators attach to the hearings, critics not only ques-
tion whether these events illuminate where nominees stand on core constitutional
principles but also blame nominees and senators for the deterioration of the hear-
ings. Nominees are accused of evading senatorial questions, which undermines the
educative purpose of the hearings (Kagan 1995), while senators are denounced for
exploiting the limelight that accompanies the most visible feature of the confir-
mation process to advance their political goals (Fein 1989; Carter 1995; Choi and
Gulati 2004; Wittes 2006; Eisgruber 2007; Vaglicia 2012). Additionally, senators
are criticized for announcing their positions on Supreme Court nominations prior
to the opening gavel of the confirmation hearings. This last criticism will be the
focus of the following investigation because, if true, this criticism that senators
declare positions on nominations before the Senate Judiciary Committee inter-
views nominees not only undermines the educative purpose of the hearings but
also undermines the role senators play in the confirmation process (Davis 2005).
3Press released was issued 2 July 2010, and was retrieved using the Internet
Archive Wayback Machine: https://web.archive.org/web/20100707102255/http:
//bennett.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=PressReleases&ContentRecord_id=
6d3aff66-a879-4f5a-b728-82882292bf99, accessed on 19 August 2012.
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Discussing two of the most controversial Supreme Court nominations, Davis
(2005) writes, “Most senators, many of whom had committed themselves prior
to the hearings, used the sessions to defend or condemn the nominee even be-
fore hearing testimony” (p. 161). For Davis, early endorsements by committee
members are followed by soft questions at the hearings, questions that are nor-
mally “unrelated to any specific legal issue and are more appropriate for a beauty
pageant” (p. 162).4 Thus, early opposition is followed by committee members
transforming an opportunity to meaningfully interact with nominees into a po-
litical circus. Although Davis’s critique primarily applies to judiciary committee
members, early endorsements and opposition from non-members prevents the the
hearings from serving an educative purpose. When senators who are both well
and badly informed announce their positions, they risk committing themselves,
which prevents them from switching their positions if new information comes
to light during the hearings. In addition, early announcements may encourage
non-members to pay less attention to the hearings, potentially weakening the in-
centives of committees members to thoroughly investigate nominees. Ultimately,
pre-hearings announcements potentially threaten the Senate’s role in the confir-
mation process because senators, especially those who are undecided, have fewer
opportunities to learn about Supreme Court nominees and are forced to turn
beyond the Senate. Davis’s critique highlights the problems accompanying pre-
hearing announcements, but it is still unclear whether senators regularly declare
their positions before the judiciary committee members question nominees.
Despite the threat pre-hearing positions pose to the role senators play in the
4 Davis (2005) makes the additional argument that committee members who endorse early
are usually involved in the selection stage. By committing themselves prior to the hearings
senators undermine their role in the Supreme Court confirmation process because they sacrifice
their autonomy at the confirmation stage for the chance to participate at the selection stage.
This he says is inconsistent with traditional interpretations of the Appointments Clause, which
hold the president nominates, the Senate confirms.
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confirmation debates, there has been no empirical research examining whether this
is something that occurs regularly or what factors influence senatorial announce-
ments prior to the hearings. In this study, I investigate whether and why senators
state their positions concerning Supreme Court nominees before the confirmation
hearings. First, I examine whether senators publicize their positions before com-
mittee members question nominees. Overall, I find pre-hearing announcements are
rare across Supreme Court nominations from John Harlan (1955) to Elena Kagan
(2010). However, when focusing on Senate Judiciary Committee members, I find
a substantial portion announce support for (opposition to) nominees, which par-
tially confirms critics’ fears. Second, I examine the factors that influence senatorial
behavior before the hearings commence. To help understand senators pre-hearing
announcements, I build on existing research that analyzes the selection stage with
formal models (Moraski and Shipan 1999; Johnson and Roberts 2005). By doing
so, I present a framework for understanding why senators announce pre-hearing
positions. I find the institutional context surrounding nominees affects senatorial
deliberation. Specifically, I find when presidents are more constrained, they are
more likely to declare support (opposition). In addition, my results show other fac-
tors are important for understanding pre-hearing deliberation. More specifically,
committee membership and partisanship affect position taking announcements. I
also find nominations since Bork have been accompanied by more senators declar-
ing positions prior to the hearings.
Position Taking and the Confirmation Debates
Position taking is an important form of legislative behavior designed to help
legislators secure reelection (Mayhew 1974). When applied to Supreme Court
nominations, scholars follow the lead of Segal, Cameron and Cover (1992), who
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“see confirmation voting largely as an exercise in position taking” (p. 105). Posit-
ing votes as positions, these scholars find a number of factors affect senators’
confirmation votes including the characteristics of nominees (Cameron, Cover and
Segal 1990; Segal, Cameron and Cover 1992; Epstein et al. 2006), interest group
involvement (Caldeira and Wright 1998), constituent preferences (Overby et al.
1992; Kastellec, Lax and Phillips 2010), and partisanship (Shipan 2008; Basinger
and Mak 2012). Although confirmation votes are positions, they are not the only
form of position taking available to senators.
Another form of position taking senators regularly employ is floor speeches. In
particular, floor speeches are thought to be an important form of position taking
that legislators use to advance their individual goals (Mayhew 1974; Maltzman
and Sigelman 1996; Morris 2001). Floor speeches provide legislators a forum
to increase their public visibility thereby allowing institutionally disadvantaged
legislators to participate in the policy-making process (Maltzman and Sigelman
1996; Rocca 2007; Pearson and Dancey 2010). In addition to advancing individual
goals, scholars have also found that floor speeches serve partisan goals by helping
parties develop party brand names or reputations (Harris 2005; Morris 2001).
Floor speeches are also an important form of position taking during Supreme
Court nominations regularly used by senators to increase their visibility and influ-
ence confirmation outcomes. However, scholars interested in the Supreme Court
confirmation debates have extensively explored the hearings (see e.g., Slotnick
1978; Guliuzza, Reagan and Varrett 1994; Ringhand and Collins 2011; Collins
and Ringhand 2013; Farganis and Wedeking 2011, 2014). While this strand of
research has demonstrated how the dynamic interaction between senators and
nominees has evolved across nominations, it is confined to the debates occurring
within the confirmation hearings and does not examine the debates beyond these
important proceedings. This research is not designed to investigate whether sen-
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ators commit themselves before the hearings begin.
Although most research examining the confirmation debates examines the hear-
ings, a number of scholars have analyzed senatorial deliberation beyond the hear-
ings. For example, Vining, Steigerwalt and Trochesset (2012), analyzing the three
most recent nominees, study how senators behave strategically when announcing
positions on Supreme Court nominees and find senatorial position taking is influ-
enced by individual senator and nominee characteristics. More specifically, using
a duration model to investigate senatorial participation, they find interest group
involvement, ideological distance between senators and nominees, and commit-
tee membership influences senatorial position taking. Similarly, Krog and Unah
(2012), who study Supreme Court nominations from Sandra Day O’Connor (1981)
to John G. Roberts (2005), find institutional factors (i.e., committee membership)
influence senatorial position taking. That is, they find committee members not
only participate more frequently in the floor debates but also announce their po-
sitions earlier.
While Vining, Steigerwalt and Trochesset (2012) and Krog and Unah (2012)
present a more dynamic portrait of senatorial behavior throughout the confirma-
tion process, these studies are not ideally designed to examine whether senators
announce their positions before the Senate Judiciary Committee has the chance to
interview nominees. That is, by analyzing senatorial position taking with duration
models, both studies examine the factors affecting how quickly senators announce
their positions and whether these factors lead some senators to announce their
positions earlier than their colleagues. Additionally, neither study is fully able
to study the context surrounding the nominations. Since Vining, Steigerwalt and
Trochesset (2012) focus on the nominations of Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan, they
do not include enough nominees to analyze whether the political context influence
senatorial position taking.
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As for Krog and Unah (2012), they study nominations from O’Connor to
Roberts and use divided government as a proxy for political context. Unfortu-
nately, divided government is not ideally suited to serve as a proxy for political
context. Based on their argument, during divided government, senators should
be more likely to participate more quickly and frequently in the confirmation de-
bates, and during unified government, senators should be less likely to participate
quickly and frequently in the debates. While intuitive, this argument does fully
account for the nominations of Roberts, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Although
Krog and Unah (2012) include only Roberts, all four nominations occurred during
periods of unified government and all four drew substantially more discussion from
senators than nominations from other periods of unified government. A cursory
examination of figures 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3, which display the percentage of sena-
tors announcing positions prior to the hearings, clearly shows the nominations
of Roberts, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan received more declarations prior to the
hearings than many other nominees.5 This suggest divided government may not
be the best proxy for capturing the optical context surrounding Supreme Court
nominations.
Theory
Nomination Regimes
Although formal models analyzing the selection stage focus on understanding
how the institutional configuration of the president, Senate, and Supreme Court
influence who is selected (Moraski and Shipan 1999; Johnson and Roberts 2005),
this framework is flexible enough to illuminate other aspects of the appointment
5The same patterns are found when plotting the average number of statements across nomi-
nations (results not displayed).
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process and judicial decision making process (Hitt 2013). Specifically, I use this as
the foundation for understanding senatorial deliberation prior to the confirmation
hearings.
Formal models of the selection stage describe three types of nomination regimes
that characterize Supreme Court nominations. First, in the unconstrained regime
the preferences of presidents are located between the preferences of the Senate
and Court. In this regime presidents and the Senate agree on the ideological
direction the Court needs to be shifted, but the Senate prefers a nominee more
ideologically extreme than presidents. Given this configuration, presidents can
reasonably expect nominees who share their preferences will be confirmed by the
Senate. Second, in the semi-constrained regime the ideological preference of the
Senate is located between the preferences of presidents and the Court. Although
presidents and Senate want to shift the Court in the same direction, presidents
prefer nominees who are more ideologically extreme than the Senate prefers. How-
ever, because presidents do not want to suffer the “loss of political capital asso-
ciated with putting forth a nominee who is rejected” (Moraski and Shipan 1999,
p. 1072), they compromise by nominating individuals who are more palatable to
the Senate. Third, in the fully constrained regime the preferences of the Court is
located between the preferences of the president and Senate. In this regime, the
president and Senate cannot agree on which direction to move the Court. Presi-
dents who attempt to shift the Court towards their own preferences and away from
the Senate can expect their nominations will be rejected. Hence, fully constrained
presidents will compromise and should be expected to appoint nominees who will
not shift the balance of the Court.
Beyond predicting the ideological preferences of nominees, the regime liter-
ature presents a framework for understanding the attention devoted to and the
controversy surrounding Supreme Court nominations. Nominations that are char-
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acterized by more constraint receive more attention. Indeed, research on interest
group participation in and media coverage of Supreme Court nominations suggests
the more constrained the presidents are the more attention nominations receive.
For example, research by Cameron and Park (2011), examining the relationship
between the bully pulpit and confirmation outcomes, indicates constrained nomi-
nations receive more newspaper coverage and more attention from interest groups
that oppose the nominees. In terms of media coverage, a similar finding is found
by Evans and Pearson-Merkowitz (2012). Although neither study explicitly inves-
tigates the relationship between nomination regimes and attention, both studies
suggest constrained nominations attract more attention.
This attention devoted to constrained nominations provides senators who sup-
port or oppose nominees ample opportunities not only to take positions and in-
crease their visibility but also to define the debate surrounding nominees. Sup-
porters will use the attention devoted to these controversial nominations to help
nominees secure confirmation, while opponents will use it to block nominees from
securing nomination. Ultimately, both supporters and opponents will want to par-
ticipate early in the confirmation process in order to define the debate surrounding
Supreme Court nominations, because if they abstain from deliberating, they risk
letting their opponents define the nomination. Hence, I expect the following:
Constrained Regime Hypothesis. Senators will be more likely to partic-
ipate in the confirmation debates when appointing presidents are fully
constrained.
Committee Membership
Since participating in the confirmation debates is time diverted from other
legislative activities, participation in the confirmation hearings is not a costless
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activity. Some senators, however, are well positioned overcome the costs accom-
panying deliberation. In particular, committee members are well positioned to
participate in the confirmation debates because they possess an informational ad-
vantage. Since they are more likely to be lobbied by interest groups, committee
have access to more information (Hall and Grofman 1990; Hall and Deardorff 2006;
Caldeira and Wright 1998). But interactions with interests groups are not the only
reasons members are well positioned to participate in the debates. In addition to
having access to more information, committee members have opportunities to par-
ticipate during the selection stage (Davis 2005; Nemacheck 2007). Participating
in the selection stage gives senators a rough idea of who is on the short-list and
more time to become familiar with the judicial philosophy of nominees. Hence, I
expect the following:
Senate Judiciary Committee Hypothesis. Senators who are members
of the Senate Judiciary Committee will be more likely to participate
in before the confirmation hearings commence.
Nominee Characteristics
Previous research examining confirmation votes lays the foundation for under-
standing senatorial behavior throughout the Supreme Court confirmation process.
Specifically, ideology and qualifications are consistently found to influence con-
firmation votes even after controlling for a senator’s home state demographics
(Overby et al. 1992), public opinion (Kastellec, Lax and Phillips 2010), and parti-
san polarization (Shipan 2008; Basinger and Mak 2012). In terms of confirmation
votes, it is reasonable to expect senators will be more likely to confirm nominees
with similar ideological preferences. Although this situation does not completely
describe senatorial deliberation, it presents a way for understanding why senators
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deliberate. Clearly, ideologically distant senators who oppose the nomination have
incentives to address their colleagues. They do it to define the nominee and mo-
bilize opposition. In contrast, those senators who are ideologically distant but are
supportive of the nominees may be more likely to discuss the nomination in order
to explain why they have chosen to vote to confirm or raise support. All of these
possibilities suggests the following
Ideological Distance Hypothesis. Senators will be more likely to partic-
ipate in the confirmation debates for ideologically distant nominees.
As for qualifications, previous research finds senators vote for highly qualified
and against poorly qualified nominees (Cameron, Cover and Segal 1990; Epstein
et al. 2006). However, it is not exactly clear how this applies here. On the one
hand, I would expect senators to be more likely to take positions earlier when
poorly qualified nominees are under consideration. On the other hand, I expect
senators to delay taking positions on nominees because they may need more time to
determine these poorly qualified nominees lack the qualifications necessary to serve
as justices. Hence, I have no clear expectations about the relationship between pre-
hearing positions and qualifications. However, I include it the empirical analysis
below, because scholars continue to find the qualifications of nominees influences
confirmation votes (see e.g., Cameron, Cover and Segal 1990; Epstein et al. 2006)
and committee votes (Farganis and Wedeking 2014).
Data
To evaluate the influence of institutional and political factors on confirmation
debates, I analyze senators’ floor speeches on Supreme Court nominations from
John Harlan (1955) to Elena Kagan (2010). Because every nominee after John
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Harlan has testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee,6 I begin with Justice
Harlan (Collins and Ringhand 2013; Farganis and Wedeking 2014). The unit of
analysis is the individual senator and all senators for each nomination are included,
for a total of 2,749 observations. To identify whether senators declared positions
before the Judiciary Committee questioned nominees, I searched the Congressional
Record for senator floor speeches from the day a nomination was submitted to
the Senate to the first day of the confirmation hearings. Specifically, I read the
speeches to see whether senators announced their positions before start of the
confirmation hearings. In total, 122 senators announced their positions prior to
the confirmation hearings across twenty-nine Supreme Court nominations.
Independent Variables
Regimes. I investigate the relationship between institutional context and pre-
hearing position taking using Judicial Common Space scores (Epstein et al. 2007)
for the preferences of the Senate, president, and Supreme Court. The Senate’s
ideal point is the median member. The Supreme Court’s ideology is defined as
the median of the Court after a vacancy occurs. Although other measures have
been used to construct the nomination regimes, I use Judicial Common Space
scores because it was designed to place all the preferences of all three into a single
dimension policy space.7
Ideological distance. I calculate the ideological distance between senators and
6The nominations of Homer Thornberry, Doglas Ginsburg, and Harriet Miers are excluded.
Thornberry’s nomination required the Senate to first confirm the promotion of Associate Justice
to Abe Fortas to Chief Justice, but Fortas’s nomination was rejected. Ginsburg’s nomination was
withdrawn before President Reagan had the chance to officially make the nomination. Miers’s
nomination was withdrawn less than two weeks before her confirmation hearings.
7I use the Senate median for the primary reasons. First, the median because it is commonly
used to represent the Senate in research analyzing the selection stage (see e.g., Hammond and
Hill 1993; Moraski and Shipan 1999; Nokken and Sala 2000; Shipan and Shannon 2003; Krehbiel
2007; Hitt 2013). Second, it is not exactly clear why the filibuster pivot should be preferred
when examining Supreme Court nominations as discussed in the previous chapter.
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nominees by squaring the difference between their Judicial Common Space scores.8
These scores were created to place presidents, senators, and justices in a unidi-
mensional policy space (Epstein et al. 2006). Since their creation, these scores are
the primary estimates used to investigate the Supreme Court appointment pro-
cess,9 and higher scores represent greater ideological distance between senators
and nominees.
Lacks Qualifications. I use Segal Cover scores (Segal and Cover 1989) to assess
whether nominees lack the qualifications necessary to serve as Supreme Court
justices. These scores were created by content analyzing newspaper editorials.
The editorials came from a set of ideologically balanced newspapers, and were
written after the nomination was announced but before the Senate voted to confirm
(reject) the nomination. This variable ranges from 0 (most qualified) to 1 (least
qualified).
Committee Member. Coded 1 if senators are members of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, 0 otherwise.
In addition to these variables, I control several other factors that are consis-
tently included in examinations of the Supreme Court confirmation process.
Bork. Coded 1 if the nomination is the nomination of Bork or after.
Same Party. Coded 1 if senators and presidents are members of the same
party, 0 otherwise.
Strong President. Coded 1 if the president is strong, 0 otherwise. A strong
president is a president who is not in his fourth year of office and his party controls
the Senate.
8Data for this variable as well as other variables normally included to model confirmation
votes come from http://epstein.usc.edu/research/Bork.html.
9Bailey scores, which are based on the votes and positions of sitting presidents, senators,
and justices, do not provide estimates for nominees who were withdrawn or rejected. By using
sitting justices, Bailey scores do not provide estimates for Robert Bork, whose nomination is
considered to be a watershed moment in American politics (Martinek, Kemper and Van Winkle
2002; Epstein et al. 2006).
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Reelection. To capture the proximity of reelection a dichotomous variable is
included, coded 1 if a senator is up for reelection in the upcoming election, 0
otherwise.
Years in Office. The number of years served by senators is simply the difference
between the year a nomination occurred and the first year a senator assumed office.
Pre-Hearing Positions
I begin by examining in Table 3.1 the percentage of senators who take positions
on Supreme Court nominations before the confirmation hearings commence. Each
column of Table 3.1 contains the percentage and raw frequencies (in parentheses)
of observations falling into each category of senatorial position taking. Assuming
the critics are correct, one would expect a substantial portion of senators to de-
clare how they intend to vote before committee members have the opportunity to
question nominees. However, Table 3.1 clearly demonstrates this is not the case.
In fact, among the 2,749 senators, more than ninety percent (94%) did not declare
positions for or against nominees before the hearings got underway. Additionally,
the table reports that 2,221 of 2,300 (97%) non-committee members and 374 of 449
(83%) committee members declared no positions on Supreme Court nominations
before the opening gavel of the confirmation hearings. Overall, the results dis-
played in Table 3.1 indicate slightly more than five percent of senators announce
their confirmation votes leading up to the hearings. In addition, Table 3.1 shows
the percentage of committee members (17%) that declare positions is approxi-
mately fourteen percentage points higher than the percentage of non-committee
members (3%). Although the cross tabulation presented in Table 3.1 suggests
few senators take positions on Supreme Court nominees prior to the hearings, it
potentially masks the variation of position taking across nominations.
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Is senator a
committee member?
Take
Position No Yes Total
No 96.57% 83.3% 94.4%
(2,221) (374) (2,595)
Yes 3.43% 16.7% 5.6%
(79) (75) (154)
Total 100% 100% 100%
(2,300) (449) (2,749)
Table 3.1: Senatorial position taking before the Supreme Court confirmation
hearings commence, from John Harlan (1955) to Elena Kagan (2010).
To examine whether the percentage of senators taking positions on Supreme
Court nominees prior to the confirmation hearings is a recent phenomenon, Fig-
ure 3.1 displays senatorial position takings for nominations from John Harlan
(1955) to Elena Kagan (2010). The vertical axis is the percentage of senators an-
nouncing pre-hearing positions and the horizontal axis displays the nominations
chronologically. What is prominent in Figure 3.1 is that senatorial position tak-
ing remains low across Supreme Court nominations. In fact, the percentage of
senators announcing pre-hearing positions on nominees is less than ten percent
in twenty-three of the twenty-nine nominations under investigation.10 Moreover,
senatorial position taking never exceeds the fifty percent threshold and it exceeds
twenty percent in only during Sotomayor’s nomination.
While Figure 3.1 reveals that position taking remains low across nominations,
10The percentage of senators declaring support for or opposition to nominees surpasses ten
percent for the following Supreme Court nominations: Thurgood Marshall, Abe Fortas (Chief
Justice), Robert Bork, John Roberts, Sonya Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan.
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Figure 3.1: Percentage of Senators taking positions on Supreme Court nominees
prior to the confirmation hearings, from John Harlan (1955) to Elena Kagan
(2010). The graph displays the percentage of senators taking positions on
Supreme Court nominees during Senate floor speeches. The nominations of
Homer Thornberry, Douglas Ginsburg, and Harriet Miers have not been included.
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it shows the proportion of senators declaring positions has not remained constant.
Prior to the nomination of Arthur Goldberg, no senators announced their posi-
tions before the hearings, but after his nomination, the percentage of senators
announcing positions increases during the next three nominations. However, fol-
lowing Fortas’s Chief Justice nomination, there is a decline in pre-hearing position
taking with nominations from Burger to Scalia remaining below ten percent. Then
comes Bork, and the percentage of senators taking positions before the judiciary
has the opportunity to question him almost reaches ten percent. While not a the
percentage of After Bork, Figure 3.1 shows another decline followed by an increase,
beginning with Roberts and continuing to Kagan.
The trends portrayed in Figure 3.1 are also found in Figure 3.2, which displays
senatorial position takings on Supreme Court nominees for senators who do not
serve on the Senate Judiciary Committee, from 1955 to 2010. However, there are
two primary differences between the figures. First, in Figure 3.1 pre-hearing posi-
tions reach their peak during Sotomayor’s nomination, and in Figure 3.2 Fortas’s
Chief Justice nomination. Second, the percentage of senators declaring positions
prior to the hearings is slightly in Figure 3.1 than in Figure 3.2, because the former
includes judiciary committee members and the latter does not.
Again, the prominent feature of Figure 3.2 is that senatorial position taking re-
mains low across Supreme Court nominations. This suggests senators who do not
serve on the judiciary committee think the hearings are important and consider
what transpires during the hearings when deciding whether to confirm nominees.
Additionally, while pre-hearing positions are rare, Figure 3.2 suggest the nomina-
tions of Marshall and Fortas are significantly different from previous nominations.
In fact, the percentage of non-committee announcing their positions is higher dur-
ing Marshall’s and Fortas’s (CJ) nominations than Bork’s. This indicates that
scholars who argue Marshall and Fortas signify a change in the Supreme Court
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Figure 3.2: Percentage of senators not on the Senate Judiciary Committee who
take positions on Supreme Court nominees prior to the hearings, 1954-2010. The
graph displays the percentage of senators taking positions on Supreme Court
nominees during Senate floor speeches. The nominations of Homer Thornberry,
Douglas Ginsburg, and Harriet Miers have not been included.
appointment process are partly correct (Epstein et al. 2006). Interestingly, the
figure potentially suggests Bork’s nomination does not usher in a significantly dif-
ferent appointment process for senators not serving on the judiciary committee. In
fact, the percentage of non-committee announcing their positions is higher during
Marshall’s and Fortas’s (CJ) nominations than Bork’s.
Overall, the striking feature of both figures is the scarcity of pre-hearing posi-
tions across nominations. But when compared side by side, they suggest Senate
Judiciary Committee members may be responsible for changes in the appointment
process. Indeed, Figure 3.3 displays the percentage of pre-hearing positions com-
ing from judiciary committee members and demonstrates some striking features.
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First, the percentage of committee members is taking positions is higher across
nominations than in the previous figures. Second, a substantial percentage of
committee members (71%) declared support for or opposition to Bork prior to his
hearings. This finding supports the contention that a large portion of commit-
tee members made known their support for (opposition to) Bork (Davis 2005).
However, less than forty percent of committee members stated a position prior to
Thomas’s first round of hearings.11 Third, besides Bork, two other nominations –
Sotomayor (58%) and Kagan (58%) – exceeded the fifty percent threshold and six
others exceeded twenty. Interestingly, the nominations of Powell, Rehnquist (AJ),
Stevens, and O’Connor do not receive positions but this pattern is similar to that
depicted in Figure 3.2
Before turning to the full regression results, I examine the basic relationship be-
tween nomination regimes and senatorial position taking prior to the confirmation
hearings. Table 3.2 displays this relationship. The dependent variable, senatorial
position taking, consists of two values: senators did announce or did not announce
pre-hearing positions. The independent variable, nomination regimes, consists of
three values: the president is unconstrained, semi-constrained, or fully constrained.
Each column of Table 3.2 contains the percentage and raw frequencies (in paren-
theses) of cases falling into each category of senatorial participation. Additionally,
it shows that 8 of 199 (4%) of senators in the unconstrained regime, 35 of 1,212
(3%) of senators in the semi-constrained regime, and 111 of 1,338 (40%) of sena-
tors in the fully constrained regime participated on the Senate floor. Overall, the
pattern displayed in Table 3.2 shows pre-hearing positions are rare across regimes.
Additionally, the table reports the percentage of senators announcing positions in
unconstrained regimes is slightly higher than the percentage in semi-constrained
11After the allegations of sexual harassment raised by Professor Anita Hill became public,
the Senate Judiciary Committee held a second round of hearings. For this paper, pre-hearing
positions for Thomas’s nomination occur before the opening gavel of the first hearing.
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Figure 3.3: Percentage of Senate Judiciary Committee members who take
positions on Supreme Court nominees prior to the hearings, 1954-2010. The
graph displays the percentage of senators taking positions on Supreme Court
nominees during Senate floor speeches. The nominations of Homer Thornberry,
Douglas Ginsburg, and Harriet Miers have not been included.
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Nomination Regimes
Participated Unconstrained Semi-Constrained Fully Constrained Total
No 95.98% 97.11% 91.7% 94.4%
(191) (1,177) (1,227) (2,595)
Yes 4.02% 2.89% 8.3% 5.6%
(8) (35) (111) (154)
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
(199) (1,212) (1,338) (2,749)
Table 3.2: Position Taking before the start of the Confirmation Hearings, by
Nomination Regimes from John Harlan (1955) to Elena Kagan (2010)
(cross-tabulation).
regimes, but it is an insignificant difference. The percentage of senators stating
their attentions early in the confirmation process during constrained regimes is
higher than in the other two regimes. But again, the pre-hearing positions are
rare across regimes.
Turning to the multivariate analysis, Table 3.3 presents results from a logis-
tic regression model (robust standard errors in parentheses) that estimates the
effects of the independent variables discussed above on pre-hearing position tak-
ing.12 Continuous predictors have been standardized by subtracting the mean
and dividing by 2 standard deviations.13 Overall, the model performs reasonably
well and provides empirical support for the notion that senatorial deliberation is
shaped by the institutional context surrounding Supreme Court nominations.
The Regime variable indicates that senators do consider the confirmation en-
vironment when’d deciding whether to announce their positions prior to the hear-
12I also ran a rare events logit (King and Zeng 2001), substantive results remained the same.
13Gelman and Hill (2007) suggest standardizing continuous to allow their coefficients to be
compared to the coefficients of dichotomous variables.
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Coef.
b/se
Senator takes position before hearing
Regime 0.839***
(0.20)
Committee Member 1.729***
(0.17)
Ideological Distance 0.039
(0.20)
Lacks Qualifications 0.083
(0.18)
Ideology*Qualifications -0.702**
(0.34)
Same Party as President 0.601***
(0.18)
Strong President 0.231
(0.17)
Post Bork 0.621***
(0.18)
Senator Faces Reelection -0.239
(0.19)
Years in Office 0.030***
(0.01)
Constant -6.479***
(0.59)
N 2749
AIC 1037.21
Table 3.3: Predicting senatorial pre-hearing announcements, John Harlan (1955)
to Elena Kagan (2010). The dependent variable is whether senators participated
in the debates (1=participated, 0=otherwise). Continuous predictors have been
standardized by subtracting the mean and dividing by 2 standard deviations. AIC
= Akaike Information Criterion. *p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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ings. As Table 3.3 shows, the coefficient for Regime is significant and in the
expected direction. When presidents are constrained, or less free to appoint like-
minded nominees, senators are more likely to commit themselves prior to the hear-
ings, even after controlling for other factors thought to affect senatorial behavior
at the confirmation stage. Moreover, this finding comports with previous research
that expects controversial nominees to draw clamorous confirmation debates.
In addition, the statistical results hold that committee membership affects
pre-hearing deliberation. As expected, the coefficient for committee membership is
positive and significant, indicating that committee members are more likely to take
positions on Supreme Court nominees before the confirmation hearings than non-
members. Given that judiciary committee members have better information about
nominees (Caldeira and Wright 1998; Bell 2002) and are more likely to participate
during the selection stage (Davis 2005; Nemacheck 2007), this result suggests
that committee members are not only better positioned to shape the discourse
surrounding Supreme Court nominations but also use their private information
to sway confirmation votes, which was also suggested by Senator Bennett’s press
release.
Interestingly, the coefficients for ideological distance and qualifications are pos-
itive but statistically insignificant. The insignificant coefficient for ideological dis-
tance suggests for average nominees the distance between senators and nominees
does not affect senatorial deliberation. This may come as a surprise to critics
of the Senate, but it suggests ideology may not be the driving force of senato-
rial behavior during all facets of the appointment process. As for qualifications,
when ideology is set its mean value (0), senators are neither more nor less likely
to declare their support (opposition). Turning to the interaction between these
variables, the coefficient for it is negative and statistically significant. However,
its substantive impact is minute.
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Several of the control variables are significant. For example, the Bork variable is
positive and significant, which indicates nominees following him were accompanied
by more pre-hearing announcements. Additionally, this finding comports with
previous research that suggests his nomination intensified the appointment process
(see e.g., Epstein et al. 2006). Likewise, the coefficient representing same party
as the president is positive and significant, suggests senators who are members of
the appointing president’s party are more likely to declare positions. As for the
remaining variables, they are insignificant. That is, when appointing presidents
are strong, senators are neither more nor less likely to make their positions known.
In addition, I control for the how long senators have served in the Senate and and
whether they are must run for reelection in the upcoming general election. The
first, years in office, is positive and significant, suggesting that the longer senators
have held office the more likely they are to deliberate. However, the substantive
significance of this variable is minimal, moving years in office from its minimum
(0) to its maximum (19) value increases the likelihood senators will participate
in deliberations by approximately ten percent. Finally, the results indicate the
coefficient for reelection is negative but insignificant, which indicates that senators
facing reelection are no more or less likely to participate in the floor debates than
senators not running for reelection.
Conclusion
Existing research on Supreme Court nomination has primarily focused on the
selection stage and confirmation stage, emphasizing ideology, as well as other
factors, for determining whom the president nominates and why senators vote to
confirm (reject) a nominee. In this study, I set out to investigate whether pre-
hearing announcement are a regular party of the Supreme Court appointment
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process. I find that position announcements are rare for most senators. The
percentage of senators making position announcement never exceeds fifty percent
and exceeds twenty percent only once. However, when focusing exclusively on
judiciary committee members, I find substantial portions of them do take positions
earlier than the hearings. In fact, the percentage of committee members taking
positions surpasses fifty percent in three nominations – Bork, Sotomayor, and
Kagan. While Davis (2005) also suggests members come to the hearings not to
investigate nominees but to politicize nominations, the analysis presented able
does not and cannot address this concern.
Ultimately, the results presented above suggest the institutional context sur-
rounding Supreme Court nominations affects senatorial participation before the
start of the hearings. Because the nominations of constrained presidents are ex-
pected to receive more attention of the media and interest groups, senators are
more likely to declare support for (opposition to) Supreme Court nominees. That
is, by participating early in the confirmation debates senators recognize that floor
speeches may not only help them gain visibility among their colleagues and con-
stituents but also influence the confirmation outcome.
Beyond the influence of the nomination regimes, I find other considerations
influence pre-hearing deliberation. In particular, two factors exercise substantial
influence on senatorial deliberation. Senators who serve on the Senate Judiciary
Committee participate are more likely to declare their positions before the hearings
than non-committee members. Substantively, this suggests committee members
are attempting to transmit their private information to non-committee members.
Additionally, sensors are more likely to announce positions since the nomination
of Bork. Additionally, I find senators in the presidents’ party are more likely to
announce positions earlier, which comports with Davis’s argument that supporters
are more likely to announce their positions.
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Interestingly, the two factors that serve as the cornerstones for research on
confirmation votes – ideology and qualifications – do not influence pre-hearing
senatorial deliberation. This suggests that senators may be more concerned with
maximizing their visibility than waging ideological battles through the appoint-
ment process across nominations. As for senators contemplating poorly qualified
nominees potentially are waiting for the hearing to commence in order to obtain
information about whether these nominees lack the sufficient qualifications neces-
sary for serving as Supreme Court justices. Finally, I find electoral considerations
and seniority do not significantly influence senatorial participation.
Overall, my analyses focus on whether senators announce positions before the
Senate Judiciary Committee questions Supreme Court nominees. By doing so, I
provide the first empirical analysis of pre-hearing position taking and contribute
to growing body of research that endeavors to present a more dynamic portrait
of senatorial behavior throughout the confirmation process. Additionally, the re-
search above contributes to the growing body of literature examining how the
institutional context surrounding Supreme Court nominations. Specifically, I find
accounting for the context surrounding nominations provides a window for under-
standing senatorial participation in these important processes. Ultimately, I find
that as senators are strategically participating in the Supreme Court confirmation
debates.
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Chapter 4
Discussing Precedent at the
Confirmation Hearings
The confirmation hearings are now the most visible feature of the Supreme
Court appointment process. The increased attention devoted to the hearings has
coincided with two important developments in the process. First, confirmation
hearings have increasingly attracted the attention of interest groups, which pro-
vide the Senate Judiciary Committee oral and written testimony for or against
Supreme Court nominations (Caldeira and Wright 1998; Flemming, MaLeod and
Talbert 1998; Bell 2002; Collins and Ringhand 2013). For instance, more than
two hundred interest groups provided testimony about Justice Sonia Sotomayor.1
Second, since the nomination of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, the confirmation
hearings have unfolded before television cameras, which has provided American
citizens opportunities to follow constitutional discussions between senators and
1Among the 218 groups providing testimony about Justice Sotomayor, more than ninety-
five percent (96.3%) supported her nomination, including Americans for Democratic Action and
Latino Justice PRLDEF, while less than five percent (3.7%) opposed her nomination, includ-
ing Americans United for Life and The Club for Growth. Data comes from the Confirmation
Hearings on the Nomination of Sonya Sotomayor to be an Associate Justice of the United
States and the U.S. Supreme Court Justices Database: http://epstein.usc.edu/research/
justicesdata.html.
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nominees. For example, the hearings for Robert H. Bork and Clarence Thomas
were broadcast on network television (Gimpel and Wolpert 1995; Caldeira and
Smith 1996) and were closely followed media events (Frankovic and Gelb 1992;
Davis 2005; Johnson and Roberts 2005). In national polls, more than fifty percent
(57%) of respondents reported seeing or following Bork’s hearings,2 and more than
fifty percent (59%) of respondents reported following Thomas’s first set of hear-
ings.3 Today, cable news networks broadcast the confirmation hearings and they
are streamed live online (Stone 2010), and more than fifty percent of respondents
reported following the hearings for John G. Roberts Jr. (59%),4 Samuel Alito
Jr. (53%),5 and Sonia Sotomayor (52%).6 Combined, the attention accompanying
2“As you know, the Senate is holding hearings on whether or not to confirm President Rea-
gan’s nomination of Judge Robert Bork to be a Justice on the U.S. Supreme Court. Have you
seen or followed any of the hearings on T.V. (television) and in the newspapers, or not?” The
survey was conducted by Louis Harris & Associates, September 17-September 23, 1987, and
based on telephone interviews with a national adult sample of 1,249 [USHARRIS.092887.R1].
Data provided by The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.
3“How closely have you followed news coverage of the Senate hearings on the nomination
of Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court? Would you say very closely, somewhat closely
or not closely?” The survey was conducted by Gallup Organization September 13-September
15, 1991, and based on telephone interviews with a national adult sample of 1,216 [US-
GALLUP.0991W2.R04]. Additionally, it is worth noting, more than seventy-five (77%) percent
of respondents reported following his second set of hearings, which occurred after the allegations
of sexual harassment raised by Professor Anita Hill became public. Survey was conducted by
Gallup Organization October 10-October 13, 1991, and based on telephone interviews with a na-
tional adult sample of 1,000 [USGALLUP.1091W2.R15]. Both datasets provided by The Roper
Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.
4“How closely do you plan to follow the Senate confirmation hearings for John Roberts
(nominated to serve on the Supreme Court), which are scheduled to begin in September (2005)–
very closely, somewhat closely, not too closely, or not at all closely?” Survey conducted by
Gallup Organization August 28-August 30, 2005, and based on telephone interviews with a
national adult sample of 1,007 [USGALLUP.05AGST28.R32]. Data provided by The Roper
Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.
5 “How closely do you plan to follow the Senate confirmation hearings for Samuel Alito
(the Supreme Court nominee), which are scheduled to begin on Monday (January 9,2006)–
very closely, somewhat closely, not too closely, or not at all?” Survey conducted by Gallup
Organization January 6 - January 8, 2006, and based on 1,003 telephone interviews [US-
GALLUP.06JAN06.R25]. Data provided by The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research,
University of Connecticut.
6“(As I read a list of some stories covered by news organizations this past week, please tell
me if you happened to follow each news story very closely, fairly closely, not too closely, or not
at all closely.)...The confirmation hearings for Supreme Court nominee Sonia Sotomayor...(If
Necessary, ask:) Did you follow...the confirmation hearings for Supreme Court nominee Sonia
Sotomayor very closely, fairly closely, not too closely or not at all closely?” Survey by Opinion
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Supreme Court confirmation hearings has provided senators with opportunities to
publicly engage nominees before attentive audiences in discussions about consti-
tutional precedents.
Scholars and journalists have criticized and celebrated the attention and oppor-
tunity associated with the limelight confirmation hearings enjoy. Critics accuse
Senate Judiciary committee members of exploiting the public attention for po-
litical gain. Purportedly, committee members have transformed what was once
an effective and apolitical feature of the appointment process into a political cir-
cus that sensationalizes ideological and partisan conflict (Fein 1989; Carter 1995;
Davis 2005; Eisgruber 2007; Vaglicia 2012). In contrast, advocates celebrate the
limelight because it allows and encourages American citizens to participate mean-
ingfully in discussions about Supreme Court precedents and the Constitution of
the United States (Totenberg 1988; Ringhand and Collins 2011; Collins and Ring-
hand 2013). For example, while interacting with Sotomayor, Senator Orin Hatch
(R-UT) stated,
Now, Judge, I am going to be very easy on you now because I in-
vited constituents in Utah to submit questions and got an overwhelm-
ing response. Many of them submitted questions about the Second
Amendment and other issues that have already been discussed.
One constituent asked whether you see the courts, especially the Supreme
Court as an institution for resolving perceived social injustices and eq-
uities and disadvantages.7
Senator Hatch then asked Sotomayor whether the majority and dissenting opin-
ions for District of Columbia v. Heller 8 were “faithful to the text and history of
Research Corporation, July 17 - July 20, 2009 and based on 1,002 telephone interviews.
7Nomination of Judge Sonya Sotomayor to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States, p. 454
8554 U.S. 570 (2008)
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the Second Amendment” (p. 454), but he is not the only senator to acknowledge
the role constituents play in these proceedings. While disagreement exists over the
utility and propriety of constitutional discussions between senators and nominees,
both critics and advocates recognize that judiciary committee members actively
and strategically participate in the hearings. However, this recognition has not
culminated in a full examination of the factors that influence the likelihood com-
mittee members will actively participate in Supreme Court confirmation hearings.
Lacking a complete examination, neither critics nor advocates can fully assess
whether the quality of deliberation during these proceedings has deteriorated.
This study helps present a fuller picture of Supreme Court confirmation hear-
ings by focusing on the factors that influence individual senatorial behavior during
these important proceedings. Specifically, it focuses on the political, constituent,
and institutional considerations that influence the likelihood committee members
will engage nominees in discussions about Supreme Court precedents. By doing
so, it is the first study to develop and test a political framework for understanding
individual behavior of senators during these important proceedings. Addition-
ally, it contributes to the growing body of research that goes beyond confirmation
votes to examine how senators participate in the confirmation process. But more
importantly, it investigates what motivates senators to actively participate in de-
liberations about Supreme Court precedents during these “democratic forum[s]
for the discussion and ratification of constitutional change” (Collins and Ring-
hand 2013, p. 2). That is, an examination of the factors that motivate individual
committee members to engage nominees in discussions about precedents helps
scholars better assess whether these proceedings are deteriorating or are serving
as democratic forums for constitutional change.
The framework I present builds on previous research and assumes that par-
ticipation in the hearings can be advantageous or disadvantageous for senators
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on the Senate Judiciary Committee. Specifically, I find empirical support for the
hypothesis that senators participate strategically in discussions about Supreme
Court precedents at the confirmation hearings. Committee members who antici-
pate confirmation will further their goals will be less likely to engage nominees in
discussions about constitutional precedents, because Supreme Court nominations
are expected to be confirmed. Since the “presumption of confirmation” accom-
panies nominations (Sulfridge 1980; Gerhardt 2000), committee members who
support the nomination need not use the hearings as soapboxes to raise support
for the nominee. In contrast, committee members who anticipate the nomina-
tion will hinder their goals will be more likely to engage a nominee in discussions
about constitutional precedents. That is, senators who oppose a nomination “seek
to portray a nominee in a negative light and try to expand the scope of conflict,
both internally through committee hearings and externally through high media
exposure” (Krutz, Fleisher and Bond 1998, p. 873).
Previous Research on Confirmation Hearings
Previous research investigates confirmation hearings with case studies or em-
pirical analyses in the aggregate. These studies provide a fuller picture of how
senators participate at the confirmation hearings of Supreme Court nominees, but
their findings are not necessarily ideal for determining what factors influence the
behavior of individual senators during these proceedings.
With one notable exception (Totenberg 1988), descriptive and anecdotal ac-
counts of Supreme Court confirmation hearings collectively express concern about
the deliberative and educative purpose of these hearings because senators purport-
edly use them to express their own political preferences (Choi and Gulati 2004),
to communicate with constituents and interest groups (Davis 2005; Vaglicia 2012),
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and to obtain commitments from nominees about how they will, if confirmed, de-
cide future cases (Fein 1989; Carter 1995; Wittes 2006). These studies emphasize
the role senators have played in the politicization and ultimate deterioration of
the hearings.
In contrast, Kagan (1995) argues the reticence of nominees before the Senate
Judiciary Committee explains why confirmation hearings “serve little educative
function, except perhaps to reinforce lessons of cynicism that citizens often glean
from government” (Kagan 1995, p. 941). Although scholars and Court watchers
alike disagree about who is to blame, these studies agree the confirmation hearings
have devolved into a “mess” (Carter 1995), a “kabuki dance” (Wittes 2006), and
an “electoral campaign” (Davis 2005). Moreover, scholars have argued that these
supposedly “abysmal” (Choi and Gulati 2004) and “vapid and hollow” (Kagan
1995) charades need a makeover.
A number of suggestions have been proposed for fixing Supreme Court confir-
mation hearings, including having only one senator speak for all the other senators
(Vaglicia 2012), having the president choose a nominee from a list composed of the
ten most qualified federal appellate court judges (Choi and Gulati 2004), having
voters elect Supreme Court justices (Davis 2005), and abolishing public hearings
all together (Kentridge 2003). The conclusions drawn from these studies are not
based on empirical examinations but on case studies of the most controversial and
unusual Supreme Court nominations: Robert Bork and Clarence Thomas. Bork’s
nomination was atypical because of the amount of attention it received from inter-
est groups (Maltese 1995a; Caldeira and Wright 1998), journalists (Carter 1995),
and American citizens (Bell 2002). Thomas’s nomination was atypical because
of the attention it received before and after the allegations of sexual harassment
raised by Professor Anita Hill became public (Overby et al. 1992; Caldeira and
Smith 1996; Hutchings 2001; Abraham 2008). Although research based on case
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studies of two of the most controversial nominations clearly demonstrates the
evils that potentially accompany confirmation hearings, these conclusions about
the quality of debate at these proceedings do not necessarily apply to all nomina-
tions and do not provide testable hypotheses for the behavior of senators at the
individual level during Supreme Court confirmation hearings.
Existing empirical analyses of the confirmation hearings concentrate on the
candor of nominees before the Senate Judiciary Committee and on the continu-
ity of questions senators ask Supreme Court nominees. Scholars disagree about
whether the candor of nominees has decreased or remained constant (Czarnezki,
Ford and Ringhand 2007; Ringhand and Collins 2011; Farganis and Wedeking
2011) across nominations; however, these studies are interested primarily in the
behavior of nominees rather than of senators.
Scholars interested in the participation of senators at the confirmation hearings
have analyzed the questions asked by members of the Senate Judiciary Committee.
Most generally, previous research demonstrates the number of questions senators
ask at the confirmation hearings has increased over time (Williams and Baum
2006; Batta, Collings, Miles and Ringhand 2012). In addition, scholars have ex-
plored the types of questions senators ask at the hearings. For example, Guliuzza,
Reagan and Varrett (1994) organize questions into three categories intended to
probe the character, competency, and constitutionalism9 of nominees. They find
no obvious or fundamental change in the types of questions senators have asked
nominees before or after the Supreme Court nomination of Robert Bork. In con-
trast, Ogundele and Keith (1999), who employ multivariate analyses to expand
on Guliuzza, Reagan and Varrett (1994), find Bork’s nomination ushered in a fun-
damental change in the confirmation hearings. Specifically, Ogundele and Keith
9By constitutionalism, or constitutional commentary, Guliuzza, Reagan and Varrett (1994)
“mean comments of a sentence or more, apart from actual questions, that senators offer regard-
ding issues and the nominee’s constitutional theory” (782).
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show that the attention devoted to the constitutional views of nominees signif-
icantly increased after the confirmation hearings for Bork’s nomination. Most
importantly for this study, these earlier examinations of Supreme Court confirma-
tion hearings provide evidence that senators’ questions are influenced by political
considerations. In other words, both the ideological preferences and judicial qual-
ifications of nominees play a significant role in the Senate Judiciary Committee’s
willingness to inquire into the constitutional views of Supreme Court nominees.
In their landmark study on the issues and precedents discussed at Supreme
Court confirmation hearings, Collins and Ringhand (2013) analyze the questions
nominees are asked to discuss by members of the Senate Judiciary Committee at
the aggregate level. Their findings indicate that the legal issues the committee
asks nominees to discuss are influenced by the political environment surrounding
the nomination. Collectively, members of the committee devote more attention to
the issue areas the American public identifies as salient. That is, as the salience
of an issue area increases, the attention the judiciary committee devotes to that
area also increases. Importantly, their findings continue to demonstrate strong
support for the hypothesis that political considerations influence the behavior of
committee members when questioning nominees.
Overall, existing empirical analyses demonstrate political considerations in-
fluence the behavior of senators during the confirmation hearings. However, the
results of these studies may not be used to make inferences about the factors that
influence the individual behavior of committee members because these studies ex-
amine the behavior of members in the aggregate. Using aggregated data to make
inferences about individual behavior is an ecological fallacy (King 1997; Snijders
and Bosker 1999). Since aggregated cannot be used to make inferences about in-
dividual behavior, I examine the individual behavior of judiciary members when
questioning nominees during these important proceedings. By investigating how
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senators interact with nominees I not only develop a fuller picture of how senators
participate in the confirmation process but also present new possibilities for think-
ing about the behavior of senators during the confirmation process that extends
beyond confirmation votes. More importantly, studying committee members at
the individual level provides another avenue for assessing whether the quality or
integrity of the hearings has deteriorated as many scholars and journalists claim.
A Framework for Understanding Senatorial En-
gagement at the Hearings
Before examining the factors that potentially influence the willingness of sena-
tors to engage Supreme Court nominees in discussions about constitutional prece-
dents, it is necessary to describe how senators may use discussions about prece-
dents to advance their political goals. First, senators consider discussions about
constitutional precedents as opportunities to obtain valuable information about
the preferences and qualifications of nominees. For example, shortly after Presi-
dent Barack Obama announced the Supreme Court nomination of Elena Kagan,
Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC), a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
released the following statement:
... As a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, I intend to be
fair and firm in my questioning of the nominee. The hearings can be
a valuable public service as they give us a window into the nominee’s
judicial philosophy and disposition. I hope we will have a meaningful
opportunity to explore the qualifications, judicial temperament and
judicial philosophy of Ms. Kagan.10
10“Graham on Kagan Nomination,” 10 May 2010. http://www.lgraham.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm?FuseAction=PressRoom.PressReleases&ContentRecord id=831144BC-802A-23AD-
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Senator Graham’s statement is not a rare occurrence, and senators who do not
serve on the Senate Judiciary Committee have expressed interest in the confirma-
tion hearings as well: “I will be thoroughly reviewing Judge Sotomayor’s record
and will follow the upcoming committee hearings for a detailed look at her record
and opinions before making a final decision” (Senator Mike Johanns (R-NE)).11 In
short, senators are interested in the confirmation hearings because these proceed-
ings help all senators reduce the uncertainty surrounding nominations and learn
about the preferences and qualifications of nominees.
Second, senators consider discussions about constitutional precedents as op-
portunities to advertise and take positions, which were originally identified by
Mayhew (1974) as two of the three primary forms of behavior legislators engage
in to secure reelection. He defined advertising as “any effort to disseminate one’s
name among constituents in a way that creates a favorable image” (p. 49), and
position taking as “the public enunciation of a judgmental statement on anything
likely to be of interest to political actors” (p. 61). Since the confirmation hearings
are highly visible, closely watched affairs, they are perfectly tailored opportuni-
ties for advertising and position taking (Collins and Ringhand 2013). Committee
members can use the free publicity to not only disseminate their name among con-
stituents but to also take positions on the issues about which their constituents
care. That is, committee members can use the hearings to create a favorable image
of themselves for their constituents. However, when judiciary committee members
exploit the publicity that accompanies the confirmation hearings to take positions,
they are using their microphones not to learn about the nominees but to publicize
their own positions (Carter 1995; Vaglicia 2012).
4CF2-F2E21C66E0BC&CFID=105704888&CFTOKEN=25124413, accessed 8 February 2014.
11“Johanns Statement On Supreme Court Nominee,” 26 May 2009. http:
//www.johanns.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=PressReleases&ContentRecord_
id=4f035144-c82c-4149-be1d-6bb3644737f8&ContentType_id=
bc82adff-27b4-4832-8fd6-aecbe3e7d8e3, accessed 12 February 2014.
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While there is no denying that advertising and position taking accompanies
confirmation hearings, senators can also use questions about Supreme Court prece-
dents to influence confirmation votes. Committee members can use discussions
about precedents to influence votes, because senators who are not on the judiciary
committee follow the hearings and take what has transpired at the hearings into
consideration when deciding to confirm (reject) a nominee. For example, Sena-
tor Jennings Randolph’s (D-WV) decision to support the nomination of Clement
Haynsworth Jr. was based on “an earnest consideration of the issues brought into
focus during the hearings and further discussed in th[e] Chamber” (my emphasis,
Cong. Rec., p. 35139). Although discussions about constitutional precedents help
senators advance their goals, the attention devoted to the hearings makes these
discussions a double edged sword.
Indeed, interactions between senators and nominees are monitored by attentive
audiences, and these audiences may hold senators accountable for their behavior
at the hearings. For example, Senator Arlen Specter’s (R-PA) behavior and ques-
tions during the confirmation hearings for Thomas became the centerpiece for the
electoral campaign of his challenger. His challenger, Lynn Yeakel, featured his in-
terrogation of Anita Hill in a television advertisement, which almost cost him the
election (Smith 1993). Although Thomas’s hearings were unusual, and Specter
won reelection, it is not uncommon for attentive audiences to monitor how ju-
diciary committee members address nominees during the confirmation hearings.
More recently, the Hispanic National Bar Association, U.S. Hispanic Chamber of
Commerce, and Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund informed
the Senate Judiciary Committee that they would closely follow confirmation hear-
ings for Sonya Sotomayor: They watched for any signs that she was mistreated
or that her views were mischaracterized and promised to use elections to hold
committee members accountable for their behavior (Hurtado 2009). As these two
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examples make clear, the behavior and questions of senators at the confirmation
hearings are closely monitored by attentive audiences, who have the power to
punish senators.
Since attentive audiences monitor the confirmation hearings, it is not unrea-
sonable for senators to believe the precedents they discuss with nominees are
closely analyzed and may comeback to haunt them. That is, active participation
in the hearings can be advantageous or disadvantageous for senators, so I ex-
pect senators will participate in the confirmation hearings strategically. Senators
who support the nomination will be less motivated than senators who oppose the
nomination to engage nominees in discussions about Supreme Court precedents.
Because Supreme Court nominations are confirmed more often than not, senators
in favor of the nomination need not discuss precedents with nominees to help nom-
inees secure confirmation.12 In fact, senators who support the nominations have
more to lose than to gain by actively discussing precedents with nominees. By
actively engaging nominees in discussions about constitutional precedents, sena-
tors risk being viewed by attentive audiences as potentially opposing or thwarting
the nomination and risk exposing the shortcomings of nominees. Hence, these
supportive senators will be less interested in discussing precedents with nominees.
In contrast, senators who oppose the nomination will actively engage Supreme
Court nominees in discussion about precedents. They will do so because “sena-
tors opposed to the nomination must bear the organizational costs of mobilizing a
majority of their colleagues against the nomination and sustaining that majority
when confronted with a new nominee” (Whittington 2006, 407). That is, they will
use questions about precedents to paint nominees as unqualified, out-of-touch, or
dangerous in order to extend the scope of the debate and arouse opposition against
12There have been 32 nominations to the Supreme Court since 1954, when nominees regularly
began attending confirmation hearings, and 26 of these nominations were confirmed by the
Senate.
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nominations (Schattschneider 1960; Krutz, Fleisher and Bond 1998). Given that
the incentives of senators who support confirmation are different from the incen-
tives of senators who oppose the nominations, the behavior of judiciary committee
members at the confirmation hearings should demonstrate distinct patterns based
on whether the nominations advance or threaten the goals of members. That is,
the willingness of senators to become actively involved in the confirmation hearings
will be influenced by whether they expect the nomination to advance or threaten
their policy and electoral goals.
Political Considerations
An extensive literature demonstrates senators endeavor to further their goals
during Supreme Court nominations. In their seminal study on confirmation votes,
Cameron, Cover and Segal (1990) posit and find senators cast confirmation votes
to advance their policy and electoral goals. Their primary results demonstrate
senators are more likely to vote for highly qualified nominees, and ideologically
similar nominees. These results continue to find empirical support in the literature
(see e.g., Segal, Cameron and Cover 1992; Epstein et al. 2006; Cameron, Kastellec
and Park 2013). More important for my argument, previous research demonstrates
ideological considerations influence senatorial behavior during the confirmation
process. Similarly, I expect ideological considerations to influence the likelihood
of senators to become actively involved in the confirmation hearings. Senators
who are ideologically similar to nominees will be less likely to discuss constitutional
precedents at the hearings. They will be less willing to discuss precedents, because
they can reasonably expect the nomination to be confirmed and do not want to risk
exposing the the nominees’ shortcomings. This leads to the following hypothesis.
• Ideological Distance Hypothesis : Committee members who are ideologically
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distant from the nominee will attempt to engage nominees in discussions
about more Supreme Court precedents.
While ideological considerations have been found to influence senatorial behav-
ior during the confirmation process, a burgeoning literature analyzes the influence
of partisanship on the process. Supreme Court nominations have become highly
contested affairs between the parties (Fein 1989; Carter 1995; Watson and Stookey
1995; Davis 2005). For instance, Watson and Stookey (1995) refer to the Supreme
Court “appointment process [a]s a political process not only in a broad sense but
in a narrower sense of partisan politics” (p. 18). Moreover, examinations of con-
firmation votes also show that partisanship influences confirmation votes (Shipan
2008; Basinger and Mak 2012). Supreme Court nominations have become partisan
affairs, because “the party contingents in Congress have become more internally
homogeneous and more divergent, and the policies made in Supreme Court de-
cisions have become central elements in partisan conflict” (Rohde and Shepsle
2007, p. 666). That is, parties have policy preferences, and those senators who
are members of the appointing president’s party should reasonably expect the
nominee to have similar policy preferences. Since judiciary committee members
of the president’s party can expect the nominee to have similar policy preferences,
they will be less willing to discuss constitutional precedents with Supreme Court
nominees at the confirmation hearings. In contrast, committee members who are
not members of the president’s party will actively discuss constitutional precedents
with nominees, because they would like to place the shortcomings of nominees on
public display. This leads to my second hypothesis.
• Not Same Party as the President Hypothesis : Committee members who are
not members of the appointing president’s party will attempt to engage
nominees in discussions about more Supreme Court precedents.
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Constituent Considerations
In addition to ideological and partisan considerations, scholars examine how
constituent considerations shape the behavior of senators during Supreme Court
nominations. Specifically, scholars following the lead of Cameron, Cover and Segal
(1990) and “imagine senators asking themselves, “Can I use my actions during the
confirmation process to gain electoral advantage? Or if I am forced to account for
my votes, can they be used against me? What is the most electorally expedient ac-
tion for me to have taken (p. 527)?” Senators contemplate the repercussions that
may follow confirmation votes because incorrect votes may cost senators reelection.
And although Cameron, Cover and Segal originally did not examine the connection
between constituent considerations and confirmation votes directly, other scholars
have done so. For example, Overby et al. (1992), in their analysis of confirmation
votes on Thomas, find senators from states with larger percentages of African
Americans were more likely to vote to confirm. More recently, Kastellec, Lax and
Phillips (2010) find senators are more likely to vote to confirm nominees who en-
joy public support. That senators contemplate the electoral consequences of their
confirmation votes should come as no surprise, because their constituents hold
them accountable for their confirmation votes (Smith 1993; Gimpel and Wolpert
1995, 1996; Wolpert and Gimpel 1997).
Similarly, I expect constituent considerations to affect senatorial behavior dur-
ing the confirmation hearings, because attentive audiences monitor the hearings,
as previously discussed. I expect senators whose constituents support the nomi-
nation to be less willing to actively participate in discussion about constitutional
precedents with Supreme Court nominees. They will be less willing to partici-
pate, because they do not want to risk exposing the limitations or deficiencies of
nominees that their home-state constituents support. In contrast, senators whose
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constituents do not support the nominee will be more willing to participate ac-
tively in discussions about constitutional precedents with nominees. Senators from
states that do not support the nominations will do this because these senators will
want to demonstrate to their constituents their willingness to fight for the issues
their constituents believe are important and extend the scope of the debate in
order to defeat policies (nominations) that threaten the values and goals of their
home state constituents.
• Public Support Hypothesis : Judiciary committee members whose constituents
are less supportive of the nominees will be more likely to discuss Supreme
Court precedents with nominees.
Institutional Considerations
Beyond ideological, partisan, and electoral considerations, institutional factors
may also affect the willingness of senators to engage nominees in debates about
Supreme Court precedent. Specifically, the order in which senators address nomi-
nees potentially affects the number of precedents senators ask nominees to address
at hearings. Traditionally, the chair of the judiciary committee questions nominees
first followed by the ranking member of the minority party. After the chair and
ranking member question nominees, the hearings proceed by “alternating back
and forth between the parties and following rank within each party” (Watson and
Stookey 1995, p. 147). Because confirmation hearings proceed normally in order
of seniority, senior senators have the first opportunities to set the terms of debate
surrounding Court precedents. For example, Arlen Specter, then Chairman of
the Senate Judiciary Committee, commenced John G. Robert’s Supreme Court
confirmation hearing by delving into Roe v. Wade:13
13410 U.S. 113 (1973)
80
Chairman SPECTER. It is 9:30. The confirmation hearing of Judge
Roberts will now proceed. Welcome again, Judge Roberts.
Judge ROBERTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman SPECTER. We begin the first round of questioning in
order of seniority, with 30 minutes allotted to each Senator. Judge
Roberts, there are many subjects of enormous importance that you
will be asked about in this confirmation hearing, but I start with the
central issue which perhaps concerns most Americans, and that is the
issue of the woman’s right to choose and Roe v. Wade.14
After announcing senators would proceed in order of seniority, Chairman Specter’s
first question was about Roe and his second question dealt with Planned Parent-
hood v. Casey.15 Being the first senator to question Roberts, Senator Specter
had the opportunity to define the debate surrounding one of the most contentious
issues in American politics.
This is not so for less senior senators. Less senior senators have fewer opportu-
nities to ask questions about precedent that have not been discussed, because the
“good questions may have been taken by the time the last three or four questioners
are reached” (Watson and Stookey 1995, p. 147). Senators towards the end of
the queue have explicitly admitted to the problems of coming near the end. For
example, Senator James T. Broyhill (R-NC), who was the last senator to question
Justice William H. Rehnquist, stated as much when he said, “As usual, when you
get down to this end of the committee, all the questions have been exhausted.”16
Given this, I expect the following:
14 Confirmation Hearings on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of
the United States, p. 141.
15505 U.S. 833 (1992)
16Confirmation Hearings on the Nomination of Justice William Hubbs Rehnquist to be Chief
Justice of the United States, p. 126.
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• Question Order Hypothesis : Committee members who speak early in the
proceedings will be more willing to engage nominees in discussions about
more Supreme Court precedents.
Data and Methods
To test the above hypotheses, I analyze every exchange between senators and
nominees at the Supreme Court confirmation hearings, with the exception of An-
tonin Scalia (discussed below), from Sandra Day O’Connor (1981) to Sonia So-
tomayor (2009). Justice O’Connor’s nomination serves as a natural cut point for
three reasons. First, her nomination has been identified as a watershed nomina-
tion, especially in terms of the hearings (Farganis and Wedeking 2011). Second,
her confirmation hearings were the first to be televised (Abraham 2008). That
is, her hearings were the first time committee members had an opportunity to
publicly interact with nominees. Third, prior to her nomination reliable public
opinion scores do not exist for each nominee across all fifty states (Kastellec, Lax
and Phillips 2010). More specifically, I examine the number of Supreme Court
precedents senators discuss at these proceedings. Although senators will discuss
a precedent repeatedly with nominees, precedents are counted only once.
An example will better illustrate how precedents are counted. In the follow-
ing exchange between Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) and Clarence Thomas, the
senator repeatedly asked the judge about Roe v. Wade:
Senator LEAHY. Judge, you were in law school at the time Roe v.
Wade was decided. That was 17 or 18 years ago. You would accept,
would you not, that in the last generation, Roe v. Wade is certainly
one of the more important cases to be decided by the U.S. Supreme
Court?
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Judge THOMAS. I would accept that it has certainly been one of
the more important, as well as one that has been one of the more
highly publicized and debated cases.
Senator LEAHY. SO, it would be safe to assume that when that
decision came down–you were in law school, where recent case law is
oft discussed–that Roe v. Wade would have been discussed in the law
school while you were there?17
Although Senator Leahy asked about Roe twice in this snippet, Roe is not counted
for each time the senator asked about it. By treating multiple discussions about
a precedent as a single discussion I follow the lead of Williams and Baum (2006),
who argue the following:
“[T]he use of multiple questions was some-times a product of the sena-
tor’s style (or a nominee’s style in responding to questions before they
were completed). Frequently, the senator asked a subsequent question
regarding the facts of the case, or clarifying the nominee’s decision.
Because of the interdependence of successive questions, we concluded
that it was preferable to count successive questions about a case as a
single question” (p. 75, fn. 13).
Ultimately, the dataset identifies every case discussed at the hearings for each
nomination. The dependent variable18 is a count of the total number of distinct
Supreme Court cases discussed by senators. The number of precedents discussed
varies from 0 to 92, with a mean value of 13.7 and a standard deviation of 15.1
(Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent vari-
ables). Because my dependent variable is discrete, I cannot use ordinary least
17Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States, p. 222.
18Data for the dependent variable come from The U.S. Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings
Database, http://www.psci.unt.edu/~pmcollins/SCCHCC.htm, accessed 14 March 2014.
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Prededents 13.17 15.07 0 92
Ideological Distance .24 .29 .00 1.13
Lacks Qualifications .24 .21 0 .6
Same Party .53 .50 0 1
Strong President .75 .44 0 1
Senator Faces Reelection .33 .47 0 1
Public Support 70.71 11.97 41.43 91.37
Order 8.90 4.95 1 18
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables.
squares regression to model what influences senatorial behavior at the hearings.
When applied to discrete dependent variables, OLS regression can result in es-
timates that are biased, inconsistent, and inefficient (King 1998; Greene 2008).
As a more appropriate modeling strategy, I use negative binomial regression to
investigate what factors influence senatorial behavior at the hearings, because
over-dispersion characterizes the spread of my dependent variable.
Independent Variables
I code the following independent variables for each nomination under exami-
nation.
Public Support. To examine how electoral consideration affects senatorial
behavior during confirmation hearings I use the public opinion scores developed
by Kastellec, Lax and Phillips (2010).19 These scores measure the percentage of
individuals who hold an opinion about the nomination and were created using
a multilevel poststratification technique that estimates statewide public opinion
support for each nominee, with the exception of Scalia, from O’Connor to So-
tomayor.
19Data for this variable come from http://www.princeton.edu/~jkastell/sc_noms_
replication.html, accessed 14 March 2014.
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Reelection. To capture the proximity of reelection a dichotomous variable
is included, coded 1 if a senator is up for reelection in the following election, 0
otherwise.
Ideological Distance. I calculate the ideological distance between sen-
ators and nominees by squaring the difference between their Judicial Common
Space scores. These scores, originally created by Epstein et al. (2006),20 employ a
bridging technique between Common Space scores (Poole and Rosenthal 1997) and
Segal Cover scores (Segal and Cover 1989) to “create comparable estimates of the
preferences of political actors of interest” (Epstein et al., p. 299). Although the
Judicial Common Space scores are not the only estimates that place presidents,
senators, and nominees in a unidimensional policy, I use this measure because it
provides estimates for all nominees since the nomination of Justice O’Connor.
Lack of Qualifications. The degree to which nominees are unqualified
to serve as Supreme Court justices. These measures estimating the qualifications
of nominees are based on the content analysis of newspaper editorials (Segal and
Cover 1989). The editorials come from a set of ideologically balanced newspapers
and were written after the nomination was announced but before the Senate voted
to confirm (reject) the nomination. This variable ranges from 0 (most qualified)
to 1 (least qualified).
Strong President. Coded 1 if the president is not in his fourth year of
office and his party controls the Senate, 0 otherwise.
Same Party as President. Coded 1 if senators and presidents are members
of the same party, 0 otherwise. Senators who are not members of the appointing
president’s party are expected to ask about for nominees.
Order. A count variable denoting the order senators question the nominee
20Data for this variable as well as other variables normally included to model confirmation
votes come from http://epstein.usc.edu/research/Bork.html.
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in. Lower values values indicate committee members are towards the front of the
procession, higher values indicate committee members are towards the end.
Results
Table 4.2 displays estimates for negative binomial regressions estimating the
effect of political, electoral, and institutional factors on the number of precedents
discussed by senators at the hearings. The first model includes the covariates used
by Cameron, Cover and Segal (1990) to examine confirmation votes. The second
model includes all covariates discussed in the previous section. The third model
also includes the covariates discussed in the previous section, but as a robustness
check, it excludes observations that are outliers. Overall, the results are consistent
across the models in Table 4.2 and show the influence all three factors have on the
number of precedents discussed by senators.
In line with the Ideological Distance Hypothesis, the results show senators are
significantly more likely to discuss precedents with ideologically distant nomi-
nees. All else equal, an increase in the ideological distance between senators and
nominees by one standard deviation increases the predicted number of precedents
discussed by thirty-four percent. To further illustrate, Figure 4.1 displays the
expected number of Supreme Court precedents discussed at these proceedings as
ideological distance increases from its minimum to its maximum, holding the val-
ues of the continuous covariates at their means and the dichotomous variables at
their modes.21 The expected number of precedents discussed by a senator with an
ideologically proximate nominee is approximately eight. In contrast, when a sena-
tor questions an ideologically distant nominee, the predicted number of precedents
is more than fourteen. Overall, these results comport with previous research that
21The expected number of precedents presented in Figure 4.1 are based on the parameter
estimates reported in Model 3.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
b/se b/se b/se
Public Support -0.021** -0.015*
(0.01) (0.01)
Ideological Distance 1.601** 1.041* 0.917**
(0.64) (0.55) (0.45)
Lack of Qualifications -0.672 -0.929** -0.747*
(0.53) (0.45) (0.45)
Same Party 0.192 0.117 0.113
(0.21) (0.16) (0.17)
Strong President -0.720*** -0.586*** -0.401*
(0.18) (0.19) (0.21)
Senator Faces Reelection -0.167 -0.249
(0.20) (0.19)
Order -0.046*** -0.030*
(0.02) (0.02)
Ideology * Qualification -1.629 -1.532 -1.423
(1.01) (1.11) (1.41)
Constant 2.809*** 4.815*** 3.981***
(0.41) (0.51) (0.60)
α -0.032 -0.133 -0.284
(0.21) (0.20) (0.24)
N 166 166 155
AIC 1186.816 1175.496 1036.279
Table 4.2: Explaining Senatorial Questions about Supreme Court Precedents at
the Confirmation Hearings from Sandra Day O’Connor to Sonia Sotomayor.
Negative binomial regression estimates for the number of cases discussed by
senators during Supreme Court confirmation hearings. The first model includes
the covariates used by Cameron, Cover and Segal (1990) to examine
confirmation votes. The second model includes all covariates discussed in the
previous section. The third model also includes the covariates discussed in the
previous section, but it excludes observations that are outliers. AIC = Akaike
Information Criterion. *p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Figure 4.1: The Effect of Ideological Distance on the Predicted Number of
Precedents discussed by Senators at the Confirmation Hearings. Y-axis displays
the number of precedents discussed, and the x-axis displays the ideological
distance between nominees and senators. On the x-axis, low marks the lower
quartile, high marks the upper quartile, and µ marks the average ideological
distance between senators and nominees.
posits senators who oppose a nomination will attempt to extend the scope of the
debate and arouse opposition against nominations (Schattschneider 1960; Krutz,
Fleisher and Bond 1998).
Additionally, and as expected by the Public Support Hypothesis, senators are
less likely to discuss Supreme Court precedents with nominees who enjoy public
support. Figure 4.2 displays the expected number of Supreme Court precedents
discussed at the hearings as public support for a nominee increases from its min-
imum to its maximum, holding the values of the continuous covariates at their
means and the dichotomous variables at their modes.22 The figure demonstrates
22The expected number of precedents presented in Figure 4.2 are based on the parameter
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Figure 4.2: The Effect of Public Opinion on the Predicted Number of Precedents
discussed by Senators at the Confirmation Hearings. Y-axis displays the number
of precedents discussed, and the x-axis displays the percentage of constituents
supporting the nomination.
a clear decrease in the number of precedents discussed. The expected number of
precedents discussed by a senator whose constituents display low levels of support
for the nominee is approximately sixteen precedents. In contrast, when a senator
questions nominee who enjoys public support, the predicted number of precedents
is slightly less than eight. These results suggest senators are asking more ques-
tions to determine the preferences of nominees, to advertise and take positions
on Supreme Court cases their constituents care about, or to extend the scope of
debate and arouse opposition against the nominees.23
In addition to ideological and electoral factors, Table 4.2 shows institutional
estimates reported in Model 3.
23Unfortunately, the data are not well suited for determining which of these reasons best
explains why senators engage nominees in discussions about precedents.
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factors also influence the number of Supreme Court precedents discussed. Sena-
tors who have opportunities to question nominees early on in the proceedings are
more likely to discuss precedents with nominees, while senators towards the end
of the queue are less likely to discuss precedents. Figure 4.3 graphs the expected
number of precedents in order senators proceed during these hearings, holding the
values of the continuous covariates at their means and the dichotomous variables
at their modes.24 The figure demonstrates a clear decrease in the number of prece-
dents discussed by senators towards the end of the queue. Senators toward the
beginning of the queue discuss approximately fourteen precedents, while senators
toward the end discuss approximately eight precedents. Ultimately, these results
comport with the anecdotal evidence previously discussed that senators toward
the end of the procession have fewer opportunities to engage nominees in mean-
ingful discussions about Supreme Court precedents because all the questions have
been exhausted.
Beyond the factors discussed so far, Table 4.2 shows senators are significantly
less likely to discuss precedents with nominees appointed by strong presidents,
which suggests senators are less likely to challenge strong presidents during the
appointment process because these nominees will most likely be confirmed. Turn-
ing attention to the other covariates, the only variable to significantly influence
discussions about Supreme Court precedents is Lacks Qualifications. Interestingly,
this result indicates that senators are less likely to discuss precedents with ide-
ologically proximate nominees who are poorly qualified. Although this suggests
senators who support the nomination prefer not risk exposing the shortcomings of
nominees, but it significantly influences the likelihood senators will engage nomi-
nees in discussions about precedents in Model 2 only. The other variables included
24The expected number of precedents presented in Figure 4.3 are based on the parameter
estimates reported in Model 3.
90
0
20
40
60
Pr
ed
ict
ed
 N
um
be
r o
f P
re
ce
de
nt
s
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
Order
Figure 4.3: The Effect of Committee Order on the Predicted Number of
Precedents discussed by Senators at the Confirmation Hearings. Y-axis displays
the number of precedents discussed, and the x-axis displays the order senators
questioned nominees.
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in the models demonstrate no significant effect on the deliberations during the
hearings. Overall, the results for these count models show the effect of political,
electoral, and institutional factors on the number of precedents discussed by sen-
ators at the hearings and suggest senators strategically engage these public and
important proceedings.
Conclusion
By investigating the factors that influence the individual behavior of senators
when discussing Supreme Court precedents with nominees, this project contributes
to a growing literature that goes beyond confirmation votes to examine senato-
rial participation during the appointment process. More importantly, this project
presents another angle for considering senatorial deliberation. In order to deter-
mine whether the hearings need a makeover, it is necessary to understand what
motivates committee members to actively participate in these important proceed-
ings.
My findings demonstrate constituent, ideological, and institutional factors in-
fluence the likelihood senators will actively engage nominees in discussions about
Supreme Court precedents. Senators whose constituents support the nominee, who
are ideologically proximate with the nominee, and who are towards the end of the
queue ask fewer questions about Supreme Court precedents. While my findings
suggest politics influences the behavior of senators at these important proceedings,
they do not definitively address whether the quality of debate has deteriorated.
To determine whether the debates have deteriorated requires additional hearings
and additional research. However, this would naturally change the focus of ex-
amination from the individual behavior of senators to the aggregate behavior of
the committee, because it would be easier to examine whether the quality at the
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aggregate level has deteriorated across hearings. Additionally, my findings do not
examine whether constituent, ideological, and institutional factors influence the
behavior of judiciary members prior to 1981. Although there is reason to believe
these factors would influence behavior at prior hearings, the hearings before and
after O’Connor are fundamentally different. Since O’Connor, senators have had
more opportunities and incentives to discuss precedents with nominees.
Most importantly, the findings here support claims that the hearings allow
and encourage American citizens to participate meaningfully in discussions about
Supreme Court precedents and the Constitution of the United States (Totenberg
1988; Ringhand and Collins 2011; Collins and Ringhand 2013). By inviting their
constituents to submit and then asking nominees about these issues senators en-
courage citizens to participate in these important proceedings. This is important
for judicial scholars as well as for scholars who study legislative behavior and repre-
sentation. Indeed, my findings suggest that Supreme Court confirmation hearings
provide opportunities for senators to discuss the concerns and preferences of their
constituents with nominees. That is, the hearings help senators better represent
their constituents and enable senators to inform nominees on the issues about
which their constituents care.
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